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PREFACE

This study is not an organizational or sociological work on
trade unions in China,

It is primarily a case study illustrating

how changes in Chinese Communist Party political and economic
orientations over time have been reflected in the Party's policy
toward trade unions.
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its branch organs
ceased to function in December 1966, victims of the Great Prole
tarian Cultural Revolution.

Only in 1973, following the rebuilding

of the Party and the subsequent rehabilitation of mass organiza
tions such as the Young Communist League, have trade unions reap
peared.

Thus, union policy in China continues to mirror broader

policy developments.
Much of the work for this study began with my doctoral disser
tation, "Trade union in Communist China:

A functional comparison

with the Soviet Union" (University of California, Berkeley, 1968)
under the chairmanship of Professor James Townsend.

While preparing

the final draft, I received encouragement from Professor Charles
Hoffman.

Research in Hong Kong was supported by a travel grant

from the Government Department, University of Queensland.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

Chinese labor policy, like any major governmental policy, has
resulted from complex interaction between elite priorities and ob
jective conditions.

Like the Bolsheviks of fifty years ago and

the elites in the emerging nations of the past decades, the Chinese
Communists came to power in an underdeveloped country with a rela
tively small and very immature work force, a low level of technical
development and a lack of investment capital.

In terms of both

industrial base and reservoir of available skills, conditions in
China in 19^9 were significantly worse than conditions in Russia
in 1917.

The Chinese also faced a high ratio of population to

arable land and a high rate of population growth.

Investment cap

ital would have to come from agriculture, as in the Soviet Union,
but the margin between production and subsistence consumption was
already extremely thin.l The Chinese Communists also came to power
committed to "lean on one side" and to look to the Soviet Union as
a model for building a national industrial economy.

Chinese labor

policy therefore shared many characteristics with labor policy in
the Soviet

Union and other developing countries.

The Chinese even

copied directly from the Soviets, initially adopting their general
industrialization strategy and formal trade union structure.

But

even these adoptions were soon modified to meet the priorities of
China's leaders, especially Mao Tse-tung himself.

A study of

Chinese labor policy illustrates primarily its uniqueness.
Chinese political and economic policy has differed signifi
cantly from the Soviet model.

One basic reason for this has been

a difference of approach to the problem of simultaneously indus
trializing, socializing and communizing an underdeveloped country.
1

2
For Marx, the proletariat was
revolution because of
ciety.

its significant position in a capitalist so

The proletariat was that class which had become "proletar-

ianized,"
tions,

to be the vehicle of the communist

i.e.,

torn from traditional,

recruited

into an

feudal

and familial

rela

industrial work force, and therefore

intensely deprived both objectively and subjectively.

When the

proletariat's situation became desperate, when it had nothing to
lose but

its chains,

it would overthrow capitalist society and

substitute a communist one.
in the nineteenth century,

For Marx,

looking at Western Europe

industrialized capitalist society was

the given, communist revolution was the predicted consequence.
In China,

like in Russia,

the communist revolution came before

the process of proletarianization.

The creation of an

industrial

work force had barely begun, and the revolution itself was based
on the peasantry.

The purpose of the revolution was to eliminate

the remnants of traditional

family and feudal

relationships and

to replace the existing regime with one committed to industriali
zation and modernization as a prelude to communism.

This meant

that the process of proletarianization had to be carried out after
the revolution.

Thus,

potential alienation of the workers by the

very process of proletarianization has
national

intensified the problem of

integration and elite legitimization.

The regime has

attempted to educate the workers to an acceptance of communism as
a world view, not only as a prerequisite to achieving communism
but also to legitimize the leadership role of the Chinese Commu
nist Party itself.
In theory both the Chinese and the Russians have assumed that
the communization of man is facilitated by objective conditions,
thus the need for socialist

industrialization.

assumed that the rate of industrialization

They have also

is directly affected

by the level of political consciousness among the people,
need for political

education and

indoctrination.

the two regimes have had different priorities.

But

thus the

in practice

In Russia Stalin

3
concentrated on

industrialization.

Only after their economic base

had been secured did Soviet leaders make a concerted effort to com
bine education with industrialization.

Under Stalin communization

efforts were largely ignored, and efforts at political
tion were limited to those citizens essential

to industrialization,

like factory managers, engineers, and model workers.
ization was not by political

socializa

education so much as

Their social

it was by

"economism," the capitalistic method of giving them a material
stake in society.

The rank and file workers were neither commu-

nized nor socialized but were controlled by labor discipline and,
ultimately,

by fear of the secret police and forced

In these terms,

labor camps.

the Soviet thaw of the fifties consisted largely

of extending economism to the rank and file workers.
In China, on the other hand, Mao has seemed to assume that

in

the final analysis political education holds the highest priority
and is

itself the primary motive-power for

industrialization.

assumption reflects Mao's so-called Yenan thinking,
nese masses,

This

that the Chi

properly educated politically and properly mobilized,

can overcome all obstacles.

To a

large extent,

the Chinese have

attempted to communize first, and thereby replace Soviet economism
and compulsion with active commitment.
attached great

They have,

therefore,

Importance to various forms of political

especially participatory forms of political

education,

education.

This emphasis relates directly to Mao's redefinition of the
concept of class
early fifties,

into terms of ideological orientation.

In the

the Party's propaganda emphasized national

unity

while playing down class struggle.

Many Party leaders had not

been workers or of worker origin, and the revolution itself was
peasant-based.

More significantly for the fifties,

needed the assistance of the national
lectuals.

the Party

bourgeoisie and the intel

The bourgeoisie as a class, defined

in terms of

its

relation to the mode of production, was destined to disappear, and
the proletariat was extolled as the leading class

in Chinese

k
society.

But the emphasis on unity was clear.

To oversimplify,

during that early period all individuals, regardless of class ori
gin, with the correct ideological orientation could be included in
the people.
accelerated,

From 1956 to 1958 the "transition to socialism" was
2

and the emphasis shifted from unity to struggle.

During the earlier period, classes in the Marxian sense including
a bourgeoisie in private control of most of China's industry still
existed, but there was also a need for unification and cooperation
to get industrialization underway.

By 1957 the bourgeoisie no

longer existed in the Marxian sense, but Mao insisted on the need
for struggle against bourgeois thinking within the remaining classes
and within individual minds.

According to Mao, everyone was subject

to bourgeois thinking, regardless of class origin.

Therefore, con

tradictions might develop within classes or among the people or in
the thinking of individuals.
This is not the place to reconsider all the partial and possible reasons for Mao's change in emphasis. 3

However, two major

implications of that change should be noted.

First, it changed

the relationship between ideology and the Party organization.

As

Mao's statements during the Cultural Revolution can be recon
structed, if ideology and not class origin is the key, then Mao's
thought stands above the Party.

Party leadership must be justi

fied by its performance toward realizing Mao's vision of the new
China; it cannot be justified in class terms by the Party's defi
nition as vanguard of the proletariat.

Party members are, in

fact, particularly susceptible to bourgeois thinking because their
leadership positions can easily lead to entrenchment and thus to
conservatism or revisionism.

In this sense, the Cultural Revolu

tion was an expression of Mao's rejection of national integration
based on role interdependency and material goal orientations in
favor of what might be called integration through ideological
agreement created by common struggle.

In labor policy this posi

tion has been reflected in Mao's preference for political educa
tion and struggle over material incentives, and for mass

5
participation over professionalism, expertise and organizational
entrenchment.
Second, the change in emphasis from unity to struggle and the
persistent tension between those two emphases have affected and
changed the nature of political education.
has had two distinct themes since 19^9.
al integration, patriotism, and the like.

Political education

One theme has been nation
The second theme has

been more ideological, i.e., Marxism-Leninism and, in the sixties,
Mao Tse-tung's Thought.

The first kind of political education has

been directed toward national integration or socialization in the
traditional sense, while the second kind has been directed toward
the communization of the Chinese people.

Ideally, both work to

ward the same or overlapping purposes, but in practice this has
not always

been the case.

The workers have been a prime target

for both types of educational effort, and the differences and
changes in emphasis discussed here are therefore conspicuous in
Chinese labor policy.
In China trade union activity is a part of the regime's labor
policy.

In this study, however, an effort has been made to con

centrate on the unions.

Chinese labor policy has reflected chang

ing circumstances over time, apparent changes in Mao's policy
orientations, and the tides of fortune in Mao's conflict with other
Party leaders on the issues of ideology versus organization and
politics versus professionalism.

It has also reflected the devel

opment of professionalism among union officials and the Party's
response to that development.
The aim of this study is chronological, to offer a general
picture of trade union performance as it developed over time.

It

should be remembered, of course, that the periodization is only
approximate and general.

4

The years 1956-1958 have been suggested

as a dividing point in the history of the Communist regime, with
certain emphases characterizing the two periods before and after
that point.

But policy emphasis has also oscillated during each

6

of those two periods.

For purposes of analysis the twenty-odd-year

history of the Communist regime is divided here into seven periods:
an early period of political and economic consolidation and reor
ganization; the period of China's first five-year plan and adoption
of the Soviet industrialization strategy and policy of one-man
management; the period from 1955 to 1957. when socialization of in
dustry necessitated and the hundred flowers policy made public a
major debate on the role of the unions; the period of the Great
Leap Forward at the end of the fifties; a period of recovering from
the disastrous effects of that campaign during the early sixties;
the Cultural Revolution; and the period since then.
Three major patterns or models of union performance are discernable in those six periods.
have had several functions:

During three of them Chinese unions

19^9"1952, 1955-1957, and 1961-1963.

Although production was at the center of their work, they were also
actively engaged in political education, administrative work, and
communication between the Party and the workers.

The second model

appeared during the first five-year plan; under the Soviet policy
of one-man management union performance was largely limited to the
single task of promoting production.

The third model character

ized the Great Leap Forward and, with modifications, the early part
of the Cultural Revolution.

During those two periods reliance on

political education was greatly intensified, and the unions were
functionally supplanted by the Party during the Great Leap Forward
and completely supplanted by "revolutionary rebel" groups during
the Cultural Revolution.

Since the trade unions have reappeared

only very recently characterization of the seventh period is par
ticularly tentative.

Basically, however, current policy fits the

third model.
Since the main presentation is chronological, an introductory
note is added here on each of the major functions assigned to the
unions:

transmission belt between the Party and the workers, po

litical education, production, and administrative functions.

7
Chinese Unions as Transmission Belt
The transmission belt role of the unions in Communist countries
involves the entire question of Party-union relations.
fore at the center of union policy.

It is there

In the Soviet Union, between

1917 and 1920, the question of union independence was openly debated.
Lenin's decision was that the unions not be formally incorporated
into the state bureaucracy, but that they be guided by the Party
from above and led by the Party from within through the leadership
position of Party members:
In its work, the Party relies on the trade
unions....which are formally nonparty. Act
ually, all the directing bodies of the vast
majority of the unions and primarily, of
course, of the...A11-Russian Central Council
of Trade Unions, consist of Communists and
carry out all the directives of the Party.
Thus, on the whole, we have a formally nonCommunist, flexible and relatively wide and
very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means
of which the Party is closely linked up with
the class and with the masses, and by means of
which, under the leadership of the Party, the
dictatorship of the class is exercised. With
out close contact with the unions...it would,
of course, have been impossible for us to
govern the country and to maintain the dictatorship.7
The Chinese position has been similar, without the initial period
of open debate.
to the Party.

Unions have been considered a "good lieutenant"
The Party is considered the highest organ or van

guard of the working class; unions are considered the organiza
tional structure of the working class and a link between the Party
and the workers.

Therefore, the unions must work under the guid-

ance and leadership of the Party. 0

The unions were formally

established as workers' organizations with the obligation of de
fending workers' interests, but workers' interests have been iden
tified with the development and policies of the "workers' state."
On the one hand.
It is the duty of trade unions to protect the
interests of workers and staff members, to
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ensure that the managements or owners ef
fectively carry out labor protection, labor
insurance, wage standards, factory sanita
tion and safety measures as stipulated in
the laws and directives, and to take meas
ures for improving the material and cultural
life of the workers and staff members.9
On the the other hand.
In order to safeguard the fundamental inter
ests of the working class...(the trade unions
must) a) Educate and organize the masses of
workers and staff members to support the laws
and decrees of the People's Government, (and)
carry out the policies of the People's Gov
ernment in order to consolidate the people's
State power which is led by the working
class; b) educate and organize the masses
of workers and staff members to adopt a new
attitude toward labor, to observe labor dis
cipline, to organize labor emulation cam
paigns and other production movements in
order to ensure the fulfillment of the pro
duction plans.
A primary instrument of Party control over the unions and
other mass organizations, in China as in the Soviet Union, has been
the leadership role of individual Party members within the union
hierarchy.

All of the top officials of the All-China Federation of

Trade Unions (ACFTU) since 19^9 have been Party members of high
standing except Chu HsQeh-fan, who before 19^9 had led the nonCommunlst but Leftist Chinese Association of Labor in Nationalist
China.

Perhaps more importantly, this policy is observed even at

the local levels.

Control within the union structure itself has

been hierarchical, reflecting the leadership principle of democra
tic centralism.

Union members were organized by enterprise or

institution, enterprise unions were organized into national unions
by industry, and national industrial unions were coordinated under
the leadership of a single national congress.^' The congress was
to be convened only every four years, however, and active leader
ship was to be exercised by the Executive Committee and especially
the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the All-China Federa
tion of Labor (ACFL; renamed ACFTU at the Seventh Trade Union

9
Congress in 1953).

In fact, no national congress has been convened

since 1957.
In practice Party policy on union structure has been flexible,
and two distinct organizational structures have been emphasized at
different times.

One is the vertical organizational structure of

the industrial unions, as just described.

The other is a regional

union organization, horizontal in structure and closely tied to
the provincial and municipal Party and government apparatus.

When

combined with other policies, this duality of organizational struc
ture has had a significant effect on the unions.

When the Chinese

have emphasized "politics in command," the industrial sector has
undergone organizational decentralization, putting effective lead
ership in the hands of local and regional Party committees rather
12
than central ministries.
The situation within the unions has
been similar.

During the early years of Communist rule the indus

trial unions were still weak, and regional union organs had the
advantage.

The industrial union system was formally established

by a new union constitution adopted in 1953; its strength increased
during China's first five-year plan, reaching a peak in 1956. 13
But the unions, along with industry, were decentralized again dur
ing 1957, as indicated by the revised constitution adopted by the
Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions.

]k

The existence of

overlapping personnel has modified the differences between the re
gional union organization and the industrial union organization,
but extensive research on union personnel by Paul Harper suggests
that significant differences do exist, especially in terms of
orientation to China's politics-professionalism or red-expert con
flict. ^ An additional effect of horizontal rather than vertical
structure is the emphasis on geographical/institutional units
rather than occupational categories or divisions of labor.

That

is, the emphasis is on the factory as composed of workers, tech
nicians and cadres and its immediate geographical environment
rather than on the relationship of workers in different plants
through the industry-wide union organization.^^ The appropriateness

10
of this emphasis within the broader policies of the Great Leap For
ward and the Maoist strategies of the Cultural Revolution will be
come more obvious in subsequent chapters.
As the term transmission belt implies, a major function of the
unions has been two-way communication between the Party and the
workers.

While the Chinese have periodically attempted to improve

the upward flow of information, this has been difficult in practice
because of the absence of any real leverage or power at the bottom.
In this respect the relation between the unions and the Party has
been similar to relations between lower and higher level cadres
within the Party.

Union officials have been in the middle; they

are elected by the workers and theoretically represent them, but
as Party members they are also subject to Party discipline.

The

Party evaluates union cadres and controls all sanctions and re
wards; therefore, union officials almost Inevitably side with the
Party when workers' interests conflict with Party directives.
The major source of information about union performance has
been criticisms of the unions published by the Party or by the
union leadership.

The unions have been criticized for either econ-

omism or bureaucratism.

Economism has meant over-emphasis on worker

amenities and reliance on material incentives rather than political
education.

Party accusations have associated it with attempts to

exploit worker demands to put the unions above the Party, and with
economic trade unionism and syndicalism.

Bureaucratism has meant

preoccupation with production but more with reports, meetings and
other office chores to the neglect of contact with the workers.
The Chinese Communists have attempted to maintain a balance among
several relationships.

Production Is to be raised by increasing

worker enthusiasm through political education, but successful edu
cation depends on worker confidence in the unions and the Party,
which is in turn contingent on proficient political education but
also on the way the workers are treated and remunerated, the gen
eral fulfillment of Party promises, the efficacy of the unions.

n
etc.

The key to this balance has been the cadre.

Without maximum

effort by competent and dedicated cadres the balance cannot be ap
proximated, but competent cadres have been few and their tasks over
whelming.
At the same time, accusations against lower functionaries may
also be used to cover mistakes or changes in policy by the Party
leadership.

When mistakes have been made or policies changed, the

onus has been officially directed either at "counterrevolutionary"
sabotage or at cadres accused of bureaucratism or economism.

The

cadres involved may be guilty of the mistakes ascribed to them, but
they may have been following Party policy at the time.

The correc

tive for mistakes has invariably been a combination of increased
Party control from above and increased mass supervision from below.
The two sides of this prescription may appear contradictory, but
they are not.

The concept of mass supervision provides the Party

with a means of enlisting the masses on its side and of criticizing
union cadres in the name of the mass line.

In a similar way, the

prescribed remedy for mistakes by Party cadres has been increased
mass initiative together with increased central Party control.
These trends are, of course, not always deal—cut.
and bureaucratism are not opposite extremes.

Economism

At times some unions

have been criticized for economism while others have been under
attack for bureaucratism or both.

Cadres have tended to swing from

one deviation to another in response to criticism from above.
But the patterns are quite clear.

The role assigned to unions

makes them consistently susceptible to certain types of actual
mistakes or deviations from Party intentions.

It also makes them

consistently susceptible to playing the role of scapegoat.
Effective performance of the transmission belt function of
the unions depends on effective political education.

In one di

rection the unions transmit Party policies and directives to the
workers, together with explanations of the broader political sig
nificance of those policies within the Party's general line.

The

12
workers are also organized to propagate and implement Party pro
grams for other social groups, like attacks on class enemies.
At the same time, the political consciousness of the workers
is an "objective condition" that must be considered in the formu
lation of policy.

It is particularly important in assessing the

feasibility of policies involving major social changes or that
otherwise depend on participation by the masses.

But the Party

must lead the masses, not follow them, and must constantly raise
their political consciousness.
This relationship is expressed in the leadership concept of
the mass line.

As an operational concept the mass line depends

on three assumptions.

First, to fulfill their leadership role suc

cessfully, Party leaders must maintain constant contact with the
masses.

Second, since the Party has superior wisdom and experience

as the vanguard of the proletariat, the Party alone knows the long
term, collective interests of the people as a whole.

Third, while

the Party must use persuasion and education rather than coercion
in taking its policies to the masses, it is the Party that must
18
lead.
Active mass participation is called for, but it consists
of executing rather than formulating or controlling policy.

In

Mao's words, "we must teach the masses clearly what we have re19
ceived from them confusedly."

Political Education and Production
Political education has permeated all functions of Chinese
trade unions.

Production emulation campaigns have been the main

classroom, but almost all union activities have involved political
education in one way or another.

While the Party played an in

creasingly important role in political education after the early
fifties, the unions have consistently provided the organizational
framework.

A major reason for attempting to increase union member

ship has been that workers outside the union system do not receive
the systematic education that can be applied through the union

13
apparatus.
Perhaps the most important part of the apparatus, in the unions
as in China in general, has been the small group.

Franz Schurmann

has argued that a major organizational contrast between the Soviet
Union and China has been the contrast between individuation and col
lectivization.

In his view, the Soviet system tended toward indi

vidual atomization suited to control, while the Chinese system has
tended toward small-group atomization, suited to persuasion, indoctrination and activization.

20

In addition to daily efforts at practical political education,
the unions also conducted courses in the histories of the Party and
the Chinese labor movement, Marxism-Leninism, and the thought of
21
Mao Tse-tung as part of a major spare-time education program.
The
schedule of one model factory was published in 1953 as an example
for other factories.

All workers spent three hours of class time

each week studying the current mass propaganda campaign and two
22
hours per week on Marxist-Leninist ideology.
It is doubtful,
however, that this ideal was often attained on a regular basis in
many factories.

With the advent of one-man management and concur

rent emphasis on labor discipline over political education, prac
tice increasingly deviated from the model.

A move to restore the

program began in late 1956 and early 1957, only to be Interrupted
again by the Great Leap Forward.

Another attempt to reestablish

systematic classroom programs during the early sixties was inter
rupted by the Socialist Education Movement and the Cultural Revolu
tion during which many hours were devoted to ideological study, but
the subject matter had changed to Mao's thoughts.
Even more important than the tension between in-class and
"living" or practical learning, but not unrelated to it, has been
the tension between the two major themes of political education
noted above.

On the one hand, political education has been de

signed to communize Chinese workers to an acceptance of the ideol
ogy or world view of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Mao

]k
Tse-tung.

On the other hand, political education has also been de

signed to socialize the Chinese workers to an acceptance of the
Communist regime and its nationalistic and industrialization goals
and programs.
Theoretically, of course, the two themes are intimately re
lated, and even in practice they overlap considerably.

But during

the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution the potential
dichotomy between them became evident when the Party's leaders dis
agreed over the issue of politics versus professionalism.

Much of

the divergence stems from the relationship between political edu
cation and production.

The attempt to industrialize and communize

simultaneously creates a conflict over the relative priorities of
those two goals Insofar as they are incompatible.

That conflict

has been evident in differences of opinion within the Party lead
ership.

Labor incentive policy embodies the convergence of polit

ical education and production mobilization, and therefore also
provides a concrete example of that conflict.
Like the Soviets, the Chinese have employed an Incentive sys23
tern in which material and nonmaterial rewards are combined.
In
basic outline the Chinese wage system has copied the Soviet system
of standard wage grades.

Wage standards for each grade are cen

trally determined, primarily on the criteria of establishing incen
tives for increased effort and ski 11-attainment, and of total wage
funds available for distribution.

As in the Soviet Union, the

availability of consumer goods has been an important consideration
in the total wage bill and the general effectiveness of material
inventives.
The Chinese system of nonmaterial or contributive incentives
has also generally followed the Soviet system of individual and
group competitive emulation campaigns and the awarding of honorific
titles to individual workers and production groups.

The awards

are often accompanied by a cash bonus and other material advantages.
For example, workers designated as "model," "advanced," and similar

15
terms receive more liberal insurance benefits than other workers.
Also, almost all workers chosen for Party membership and/or promo
tion to cadre status or administrative positions have been either
model workers or worker activists. 25
If the Chinese incentive system has copied the Soviet model in
outline, however, it has differed in detail and in style.

Commu

nist theory posits the superiority of various forms of contributive
incentives over the "capitalistic" incentive of individual wages.
Ideally, the communist worker contributes his labor freely to the
collective and receives from it a stipend adequate to his needs.
In practice, both the Chinese and Soviet leaders have deemed indi
vidual material incentives necessary.

Expressed in theoretical

terms, these countries are considered to be in a socialist rather
than communist stage of development, and the "correct" wage policy
for that stage is remuneration according to labor rather than
26
according to need.
The Russian answer to the problem of work incentives under
conditions of economic scarcity was a combination of material in
centives, contributive incentives and compulsion.

The essential

features of the Soviet system of material incentives—progressive
piece wages and very sharp wage differentials—were contrary to
the egalitarian wage policy favored by many of the union leaders
purged in 1928-1929 and to the assumptions of Marxist theory about
the solidarity of the working class under a socialist regime.

In

addition, the Soviet system of contributive incentives was a mod
ified system at best.

It included symbolic rewards and appeals to

patriotism and other collective values, but the heart of the sys
tem was Stakhanovism and "socialist competition."

Both were based

on competition rather than collectivity, and both were tied to
28
monetary incentives.
The entire incentive policy, in fact, fo
cused on "leading groups" of workers, such as the Stakhanovites,
who were able to benefit from very steep piece-wage differentials
and who were basically rate-busters.

Wage increases received by
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most workers were more than offset by inflation, so that real wages
for all Soviet nonagricultural wage-earners declined steadily from
1928 to about 1950.^^
The Chinese Communists have also recognized the need for remu
neration on the basis of work done as long as all Chinese workers
are not Communists.

During most periods since 19^9 they have ar

gued, in fact, that attention to workers' welfare was a prerequisite
for effective political education.

Only twice, during the Great

Leap Forward and during the Cultural Revolution, have they actually
rejected material incentives.

But throughout the twenty years of

their regime, they have emphasized much more than the Russians the
cooperative aspects of emulation and the need to combine emulation
with political education.

They have also used piece wages on a

much smaller scale than the Soviets and have based their emulation
programs much more on production groups than on individuals.
These differences from the Soviet model have been consistent,
but the tensions and changes in emphasis have continued.

There

are obvious advantages to an effective system of non-material la
bor incentives.

Under conditions of limited capital and a limited

consumer market, it is a valuable supplement to total wage alloca
tions.

It may also provide a degree of labor discipline that can

not be achieved by wage incentives.

It is especially conducive to

quality control because it does not encourage workers to find
shortcuts that reduce their own work effort at the expense of co
workers and the whole production process.

Most importantly, an

incentive policy based on competition for material rewards is of
course, incompatible with communist education but rather compat
ible with political education aimed at traditional socialization
and thus conducive to socialization efforts.
The success of persuasive exhortation and other non-material
incentives is conditional.

It will depend for effectiveness on

the workers' view of their own position in society.

That view

will be influenced by the degree of technical skill and general
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education of the work force, the ability of the workers to influ
ence trade union policies, union effectiveness in the society at
large, and not least, by the level of worker remuneration.
Contributive incentives are therefore likely to be much more
effective for stimulating marginal productivity than as the basic
method of creating labor discipline unless a total conversion of
worker views on work and remuneration can be achieved.

In addi

tion, at some point in the industrialization process labor produc
tivity becomes primarily a function of industrial technology, mech
anization and rationalization rather than labor discipline or in
tensification of labor.

In the long run, political education can

only supplement but not replace technology.

This conflict within

the Chinese incentive policy reflects the broader conflicts over
Chinese labor and general industrial policy.
Administrative Functions of Chinese Trade Unions
Lenin called Soviet trade unions schools of management and
schools of administration, ostensibly looking toward a future when
the workers could manage industrial enterprises and even the state
itself.

This idea was soon abandoned by Stalin, but it has not

been entirely abandoned in China.

More importantly, the Chinese

have been committed to active worker participation in the factories
as much for its socialization and political education value as for
administrative training.

They have, for example, periodically

attempted to establish meaningful roles for factory workers' con
ferences, under the guidance of both Party and union, even if such
attempts have been short-lived.
Moreover, the unions have consistently administered industrial
welfare programs, taking up much of their time and energy, and have
attempted to engage large numbers of worker activists in these pro
grams.

The unions have also played a peripheral role in programs

for general and technical education for the workers and have per
formed other administrative roles at various times.

The unions
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have actively participated in a large variety of administrative
programs and also mobilized the workers for participation.

This

also has served the Party by relieving it of various administrative
chores.

In sum, there has been in China a desire for active worker

participation in the factories and in the state that contrasts
sharply with the spirit of control that prevailed in the Soviet
Union.
A major task in which the unions did not participate was the
allocation of labor, attended to by Labor Bureaus under the Minis
try of Labor.

In contrast to the unions whose roles and functions

were primarily internal to the factories, the Labor Bureaus for
mally mediated labor-management relations above the factory level
and oversaw various labor regulations, such as those pertaining to
working conditions.

By 1957, however, as industry was socialized

and the Party became Increasingly committed to complete control
over labor allocation, the Bureaus' primary functions were super29
vision of unemployment and labor assignment policies.

Chapter 11
THE HONEYMOON PERIOD, 19^9-1952

The main economic goal of the Chinese Communists has been so
cialist industrialization, that is, industrialization of the Chinese
economy and socialization of industry, handicrafts, and agriculture.'
The strategy for industrializing the economy adopted by the Party in
19^9 and the early fifties was in essence the Soviet program for in
dustrialization.

Before China's first five-year plan could be im

plemented, however, the country had to be prepared.
The years 19^9 to 1952 were a period of consolidation for the
Chinese Communists.

After they had won the civil war in 19^9» they

faced the task of moving from rural guerrilla centers to the cities
and the poiitical consolidation of their victory.

In industry, too,

this was a period of consolidation, sometimes aimost of starting
from scratch.

China in 19^9 was characterized by severe economic

scarcity and underdevelopment.

The economy had in the forties been

ravaged by the Sino-Japanese War, the civil war and the sabotage of
retreating Kuomintang troops.

The industrial complex established

by the Japanese in Manchuria had been stripped by occupying Russian
2
soldiers.
Communication and transportation systems and many fac
tories had been destroyed.

Inflation was rampant.

In terms of

both industrial base and reservoir of available skills, conditions
in China were significantly less favorable than conditions In Rus
sia after the October Revolution.
Labor policy was Influenced by both the flush of victory and
the major tasks facing the regime.

It was in many ways a honey

moon period for the unions and the workers.

The support and pai—

ticipation of the workers was actively wooed, and many were pro
moted to cadre and administrative positions.
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A national labor
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insurance program was introduced and widely publicized.

The unions

were assigned many different functions and allowed a degree of in
dependence in carrying them out.

The specific tasks assigned to

them reflected this general orientation.

To the extent that an in

tegrated program of interrelated functions was realized, categori
zation is somewhat artificial.

Nevertheless, various union func

tions are discussed separately for analytic purposes.
The major administrative tasks of the unions during this ini
tial period were building the unions and recruiting cadres, assist
ing the Party to recruit workers for cadre and administrative linestaff positions, representing the workers in the factories, and
introducing labor insurance and related welfare programs.

Building the Unions and Recruiting Cadres
In the early years of the Communist regime the unions played
a prominent role, in collaboration with the Party, in building
their own organization and in recruiting workers for promotion.
The organization and reorientation of the union structure and
the recruitment of union members was, logically and chronologically,
the first task of the unions.
unions where none existed.

Union cadres were sent to establish

In enterprises with established unions,

teams of cadres were sent in to break the power of gang-labor
chiefs and to reorganize the unions. 3 The process of screening
workers during this period was, in fact, overly rigorous in many
areas.

According to Hsii Chih-chen, many cadres committed the

error of "closed doorism," excluding workers on the bases of ideological leanings, work ability, and educational level.

It

As Hsli

argued, a major function of the unions was to educate the workers
to overcome those very disabilities.

At the same time, an attempt

w?s made to screen intransigent trouble-makers and "counterrevolu
tionaries" from union membership and especially from positions of
authority.
As in the Soviet Union, membership in unions was not compulsory.
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but every effort was made to persuade workers to join.

In addition

to the personal efforts of union and Party cadres, the press de
voted considerable space to publicizing increases in union member
ship and the advantages of membership.

The administration of labor

insurance was also coordinated with this effort.

According to the

ACFTU, workers in "key" Industries and cities were "basically or
ganized" by the end of 1950.^ By the end of 1952 ninety percent of
all industrial workers had joined unions.^

Recruitment became an

issue again only in 1958 when the number of workers suddenly in
creased from nine million to more than twenty-five million as a
result of the policies of the Great Leap Forward.
recruitment problem was not major.

Even then the

Many of the new workers were

only part-time and thus ineligible for union membership.

Also dur

ing that period much of the mobilization of the workers was carried
out by the Party committees directly, obviating mobilization by the
unions.
In 19^9 the unions were also assigned the task of assisting the
Party branches select and nominate workers for cadre posts and as
sisting In the promotion of competent workers to administrative
positions.

In most cases these workers were first or simultaneously

recruited into the Party.

After these early years the unions were

not mentioned in connection with this task at all, and industrial
enterprises came to be staffed more and more by Party members who
were sent to technical schools on the Party's initiative.

But dur

ing this early period the assistance of all official and semi
official organizations was necessary.

And the unions did continue

to provide practical administrative experience and areas for activ
ism through which individual workers could distinguish themselves
for promotion.^

Representing the Workers
According to Articles Five and Six of the Trade Union Law of
the People's Republic of China:
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Trade unions in enterprises operated by the
state or by co-operatives shall have the right
to represent the workers and staff members in
taking part in administering production and in
concluding collective agreements with the man
agements.
Trade unions in private enterprises shall have
the right to represent the workers and staff
members in conducting negotiations and talks
with the owners of these private enterprises,
in taking part in the labour-capital consulta
tive councils and in concluding collective
agreements with the owners of these private enterprises.®
As one would expect, however, not only did the nature of this func
tion depend on whether an enterprise was state or privately owned,
it was also particularly susceptible to fluctuations in Party pol
icy in both types of enterprise.
Before the general nationalization of industry in the mid
fifties, the state assumed ownership of those enterprises previously
owned by the Kuomintang government or by bureaucratic capitalists.
A transitional system of factory management was established in stateowned enterprises.

Since control and communications networks of the

central authorities had not yet been consolidated, practice did not
always conform to stated policy, and geographical diversity existed.
But the general pattern was as follows.

In most ai:;eas enterprises

were actually taken over by the army's Military Control Commissions.
The enterprises were then administered by Factory Administrative
Committees consisting initially of top managerial and engineering
personnel, local Party cadres, and military commanders.

In effect,

because the military and Party personnel lacked technical and ad
ministrative competence, the managers retained operational direction
of the enterprise while the military and Party personnel held ulti9
mate veto power.
Official policy called for a change in state-owned enterprises
to a system of collective or democratic management as soon as pos
sible.

What this meant in practice was that the Party committees

came increasingly to dominate factory affairs.

But the unions also
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played a significant role.

It was their duty to educate the work

ers preparatory to participating in democratic management, and they
were to organize Staff and Workers Representative Councils which
»

elected representatives to the Factory Administrative Committees.
Many of the tasks of the Facotry Committees were, in fact, handled
by standing committees consisting of the factory manager, the head
of the union, and a third member who was "co-opted by the Factory
Administrative Committee."^^
In private industries worker-management relations were to be
systematized by the establishment of laboi—capital consultative
councils.

The unions appointed worker representatives to the coun

cils, and the union chairman was an ex-officio member of the coun
cil along with the owner or his representative and the manager.
Labor-management relations centered on the adoption of factory col
lective agreements and the settlement of grievances, but these two
issues were important in form only.
Collective agreements in China have followed the pattern es
tablished in Soviet industrial relations.

The primary function of

the agreements has been to publicize the factory production plan
established by the state.

In China the agreements have also had a

second purpose, to establish management's responsibilities to the
staff and workers that included the hiring and firing of workers,
certain issues related to wages such as overtime pay and bonuses,
treatment of apprentices, and equality of wages for men and women,
the establishment of working hours and holidays, protection of fe
male and child labor, and welfare benefits pertaining to workers
in enterprises with less than one hundred employees and thus not
participating in the national labor insurance program.

Policies

on these issues differed slightly from one type of enterprise to
another, but they were basically defined by national labor legis
lation.
The unions were also formally designated to represent the
workers in consultation with management to settle grievances.'^

2k

In practice, however, the Chinese have favored informal mediation
and persuasion over formal mediation and arbitration procedures,
and formal grievance procedures are almost never mentioned in the
Chinese labor press.
The formal worker and union role in the state-owned factories
was therefore much greater than in private factories, with equal
representation on the Factory Administrative Committees and their
own Representative Councils to provide mass supervision of manage
ment, "tap the wisdom of the workers," and give the workers a sense
of active participation in the enterprise.

On the other hand,

workers and unions were expected to cooperate more consistently
with state managers than with private managers.

In sum, this was

a period of relatively active participation by workers and unions.

Welfare Tasks
Workers' welfare more than any other activity has been the
special concern of the unions in China. Primarily, they have had
total responsibility for the administration of labor insurance.'^
They have also been responsible for general assistance to the work
ers (for example, mediating marriage disputes, helping workers bud
get their incomes, and organizing mutual aid societies), for organ
izing and administering cultural and recreational facilities, and
for certain tasks related to labor protection or factory conditions.
The performance of all these tasks has reflected, once again,
fluctuations in general economic policy.

During the early years

labor insurance was in the limelight.
In February of 1951, labor
insurance regulations were issued by the Chinese government.'^
Under these regulations, in plants with more than 100 workers the
management was to provide insurance benefits for retired, injured,
and child-bearing workers.

In smaller plants, workers and manage

ment were to reach agreements negotiated by the unions.

In enter

prises regularly covered by the national insurance program the
unions managed insurance funds and carried out all duties connected
with the collection and distribution of insurance funds.
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The unions were also made responsible for establishing "com
munal labor insurance establishments," i.e., sanatoria, rest homes
for the aged, orphanages, and homes for the disabled.

Both the

ACFTU and local unions sponsored such establishments.

In major in

dustrial centers, union councils also opened schools to train labor
insurance officials. According to official statistics, 200,000
cadres had been so trained by 195^.^^
During the early fifties the administration of labor insurance
reflected other current policies.

The unions were attempting to

encourage voluntary membership by all eligible employees by point
ing out that union members received superior insurance benefits.
The unions' major focus of attention was the organization of emula
tion campaigns for production in which they recommended model work
ers for special benefits.

The regime was also trying to liberate

women and bring them into the work force by making insurance pro
visions for women workers during childbearing.
In the field of cultural and recreational facilities, the
unions were to establish clubs, cultural halls or palaces, librar
ies, and cultural and recreational programs.

One of the major

reasons for these programs initially was presumably to occupy the
workers' spare time and thus control such activities as gambling
and drinking.

But it was also designed to serve the positive func

tion of conducting both cultural and political education among the
workers.

By the end of 1955 all factories with more than 100 work

ers reportedly had their own recreational clubs.Aside from this
figure, however, very little was published about the activities
themselves during the early fifties.

Before they were significantly

developed, they were preempted by production efforts with the be
ginning of China's first five-year plan, and cultural education
became temporariiy the responsibility of management.

]

8

Political Education
Political education is discussed in some detail in the pre
vious chapter.

During this early period the effort to socialize
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the workers predominated.

The workers were lauded as the leading

class in the state, and improvements in the lives of the workers
since "liberation" were emphasized along with the role of the Party
in providing those improvements.

Another major theme of political

education during this period was the patriotic "Resist-U.S., AidKorea" campaign.
leadership.

China now belonged to the workers, under Party

Conditions were already better than before "libera

tion," as evidenced, for example, by the new national labor insur
ance program.

But the major tasks of industrialization lay ahead,

and the country was threatened from without.

Therefore the workers

must also realize their responsibilities as the leading class and
sacrifice immediate and partial interests for the overall and long
term interests of the state as spelled out in Party programs and
policies.
The attempt to coordinate these lessons is illustrated by the
nature of union participation in the "Anti-U.S." movement.

In Octo

ber of 1950, a patriotic emulation or production-mobilization cam
paign was initiated in the Northeast and soon became nationwide.
The thesis connecting the emulation campaign to a broader propaganda
movement was that a truly prosperous China could only be built after
the defeat of American imperialism in Asia, particularly in Korea at
that time, and that the United States could only be defeated in
19
Korea by increased production within China.
In addition to the
production campaign, the unions were also to organize the workers
for related educational programs, demonstrations against the United
States, and patriotic donations to the war effort.
Product ion
In China, as in other developing countries, production has
been a central function of the unions.

It has been at the center

of a relatively unified union policy in which specific tasks re
lating to production, incentives, welfare, and political education
are all closely related.

The emphasis in approach to stimulating

production during a given time period has reflected Party policy
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emphases.

Labor emulation campaigns or socialist emulation cam

paigns have been the cornerstone of Chinese industrial incentive
policy.

The goal has been continuous participation in some form of

emulation by the entire work force.

Even by early 1951 an estimated

2.23 million workers had participated in emulation campaigns.By
the end of 1953 more than 223,000 people had been designated model
u

workers.
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China's early campaigns were similar in many ways to Soviet
Stakhanovite emulations.

Shock workers or shock brigades, for ex

ample, would establish new production records by the "improvement
ot tools" and the "improvement of work organization," the latter
being basically the division of work processes into essential and
auxiliary tasks to allow the shock worker to concentrate entirely
on the production record, while another worker performed the aux
iliary tasks.

Since it is often more efficient for the worker to

perform his own auxiliary tasks, this approach is appropriate only
under conditions of surplus labor and/or for rate busting to estab
lish new records for other workers to emulate.
But early Chinese emulation campaigns differed from Soviet
Stakhanovite campaigns in two ways.

First, they emphasized work

group performance rather than individual performance.

They tended,

therefore, to integrate rather than divide production units.

A

major part of the publicity connected with the "new records" cam
paign, for example, was devoted to the Ma Heng-chang shock brigade.
The second difference was the emphasis on combining emulation with
national mass propaganda campaigns such as the "Anti-U.S." movement.
Transmission Belt
The transmission belt function of the unions is discussed in
this study essentially in terms of Party criticism of union per
formance.

This has both advantages and disadvantages.

The manner

in which the unions serve as a link between the Party and the workers
provides an overview of how well they are carrying out other duties,
how well they are communicating with the workers, and how their

28

orientation to their own work differs from Party expectations.

It

also means that our perspective will be primarily from the top down
rather than from the point of view of the workers or even the unions.
It also means that the emphasis will be on crises and periods of
major reorientations in union-Party relations rather than day-today functioning.
The first crisis in Party-union relations came in the early
years of the regime and was widely publicized at the Seventh ACFTU
Congress in 1953.

This attack was directed at the national union

leadership which was accused of economism and of seeking independence from Party control.
the individual

The unions had "arbitrarily" stressed

interests of the workers as against the overall

long-term interests of the state, and the national leadership had
led lower union organs away from the Party and had considered the
2k
unions the "highest form of organization of the working class."
Party priorities and expectations were much different in 1953
than in 1951 when these deviations had taken place.

The Seventh

ACFTU Congress was held to redirect union activities in preparation
for significant changes in economic policy.
therefore, undoubtedly overstated.

Party accusations were,

Union activities, however, had

inclined toward independence and economism in 1951 for several
causes.
One cause of union independence during 1951 was circumstantial.
In theory, the unions were from the outset under the leadership of
the Party, but in 1951 the Party was still consolidating its own
position.

Potential rivals were being eliminated, and the Party

was recruiting the cadres necessary to rule the country.
situation had several consequences for the unions.

This

First, the

workers and unions could be used to attack the capitalists.

Second,

worker support was being actively wooed, as evidenced by the strong
emphasis on labor insurance and the lack of emphasis on labor dis
cipline during this period.

That is, Party policy itself tended

to economism during this honeymoon period.

The success of the
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revolution combined with Party propaganda about the leadership role
of the workers must have created very high expectations among the
Chinese workers.

And, third, the Party did not seem to exercise

very direct control over union affairs during this period.

The

Party issued policies, but they were carried out by the unions in
a relatively independent way.
Paul Harper has suggested an additional point in this connec
tion.

The functionaries of the old Chinese Association of Labor

(cal) had been absorbed into local unions after CAL was dissolved.
Most of these men were non-Communists and had been exposed to the
union philosophy of the West.

Many of them, therefore, may have

been more committed to economic or trade unionist struggle than to
political struggle.

The relevance of this point would seem to

be modified by the fact, not overlooked by Harper, that Party criti
cism during this period was directed almost entirely at the national
leadership and not at local units.

At the same time, out of the ten

representatives from the CAL included in the top ACFL leadership
after the Sixth ACFL Congress in 19^8, five were replaced or dropped
at the Sixth Executive Committee of the ACFL during 1950-195i.^^
A second cause of union economism during this period apparentiy
was a reaction to earlier criticisms by the Party.

The initial task

in the factories in early 1950 had been to restore production.
line with this the linions had worked closely with management.

In
As a

consequence, by the middle of 1950 the unions were criticized for
over-emphasizing production and becoming divorced from the workers.
A third major cause of union mistakes was presumably a differ
ence of opinion between top union leaders and top Party leaders.
According to the Trade Union Law of 1950:

"The trade unions have

their own nationwide, independent and unified system of organize28
tion."
This statement was missing from the Revised Trade Union
Law of 1953.

The ACFL, expanding and consolidating its control

over a revamped union structure, also attempted to exert its statu
tory independence, which invoked a strong reaction from the Party.
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These union deviations during 1951 were attributed mainly to
Li Li-san.

Li, as Minister of Labor and a Vice President of the

ACFL, had been the official spokesman on labor and union policy in
China since I9A8.

At the Seventh Congress he made no statement and

was not elected to the new Secretariat of the ACFL (renamed the AllChina Federation of Trade Unions, ACFTU, at that Congress).

Al

though he retained his position as Minister of Labor for two more
years, his last major policy speech was delivered in February of
1951.^^ At the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956 Li offered
a vague apology for "mistakes I made when I was working at the AllChina Federation of Trade Unions," without specifying the nature
of those mistakes. 30 The official version of Li's mistakes and
those of other ACFL leaders was that they
formulated a series of mistaken views, namely:
the administration side should represent the
whole and long-term interests, while the trade
union side should represent individual and im
mediate interests; the administration side
should represent production, while the trade
union side should represent distribution, etc.’’
The points emphasized here were obviously that the unions were not
to be independent of the Party and that union goals were not dif
ferent from Party goals.

Production, not worker remuneration, was

the unions' primary consideration.

The workers, through the unions,

were to be used by the Party against the capitalists.

But their

conflict with management was as a part of "the people" and not as
workers or union members.

They were to confront enterprise owners

on such issues as obeying state laws and cooperating in state
plans, not on the issue of wages.
The union sins of economism and excess independence were as
cribed to the central organs of the ACFL.

The second attack on

the unions was directed at lower-level cadres and concerned mistakes
of quite a different nature.

By 1952 and 1953 the unions were

caught up in the policy changes introduced by the san-fan and wu-fan
32
movements and prepatory to China's first five-year plan.
The
unions were assigned a major role in the attack on capitalists
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during that campaign.

This, of course, changed the task orienta

tion of the unions in private enterprises.
But the unions also came under attack and were reorganized
during the san-fan movement.

For the unions those campaigns began

with a Democratic Reform Movement which was launched in the North
east in 1951.

It was essentially a movement to purify factory-

level unions of "bad elements" who persisted in old pa tao practices
of taking bribes for obtaining jobs for people. 33 The san-fan cam
paign, as it applied to the unions, was an intensification of that
purification process.
Union cadres were accused of the three general sins of extrav
agance, waste, and bureaucratic work style from which the movement
received Its name.

They were also accused of inadequately super

vising managers and thus of allowing irregularities to occur, of
failing to promote workers, of bowing to the technical expertise
of retained administrators, and of neglecting the political education of the workers.

Some union cadres had allowed themselves

to be bribed or corrupted by the owners and managers.

In the most

serious cases they were accused of gross corruption in their own
union work.^^ Lai Jo-yu, the new ACFTU president, and other mem
bers of the national union leadership formally confessed to the
lesser charges of extravagance, waste, and bureaucratism.

36

Lower-

level cadres were subjected to criticism and, in the more serious
cases, purged from leadership positions in the unions.
The attacks on the unions at this time were preparatory to
policy changes, but they were also intended to "purify" the unions.
Most of the union cadres purged during the Democratic Reform Move
ment and the san-fan movement were from one of two groups:

old

union officials who had stayed at their posts after 19^9 without
sufficiently reforming, and cadres from the old Communist guerrilla
areas who were "corrupted" by the move to the cities and their
new positions of authority.

Replacements for purged cadres were

recruited primarily from worker activists who proved their merit
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during the san-fan and wu-fan campaigns.
The wu-fan campaign also involved mobilization of the workers.
They were organized by the unions to voice grievances and to hold
"confrontation meetings" with employers. 37 This served to pressure
employers toward the regime's goals and also served to mobilize the
workers who, especially in old industrial cities like Shanghai, had
remained closely tied to their employers.

Chapter 111
CHINA'S FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE SOVIET
MODEL, 1953-1955

By the end of 1952 the major preliminary tasks of the regime
had been accomplished.

Social order had been established, and

China's industrial base had been rehabilitated.

The inflationary

spiral had been broken as early as March of 1950, and control over
the country's fiscal system established in 1951.

The influence of

remaining class enemies had been largely eliminated.

In 1953

China's first five-year plan began and with it China's attempt at
implementing the Soviet model of industrial development.^ The
major characteristics of that model were centralized planning of
the economy, including the establishment of production and growth
targets for industry, agriculture and other economic branches, the
priority of industrial investment over consumption, the priority of
investment in heavy over light industry, and organization and con2
trol of the economy by large ministerial bureaucracies.
At the same time a major effort was made to introduce the
Soviet system of one-man management in Chinese factories.

Even be

fore that time the system was in operation in factories where Soviet
influence was prominent, especially the joint Sino-Soviet factories
at Dairen and the heavy industrial factories of Manchuria.

Its

basic feature was vertical command, from a single plant manager to
shop supervisor to section chief to production team heads.

Mana

gers received directives from, and were directly responsible to,
the central ministries.
in theory, all inclusive.

Their jurisdiction within the factory was,
The role of the Party committee was

therefore reduced to ideological guidance of the manager, and un
ion-worker participation in management atrophied.

In a later

criticism of this development concerning worker participation.
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Li Hsueh-feng addressed the Eighth Party Congress as follows:
Conferences and delegate conferences of work
ers and staff members which in themselves are
one of the best ways to promote democracy in
the enterprises are often turned into meetings
at which the leadership assigns tasks and the
masses give their pledges. The mass of the
workers and staff members describe such meet
ings as occasions when "the director makes a
report, the Party committee gives instructions,
the trade union issues a call, and the masses
give their pledges."^
Formal union functions remained relatively unchanged from the
previous period, but introduction of the Soviet model profoundly
changed actual union tasks.

The pattern of union performance dur

ing this period definitely emphasized production and labor disci
pline, to the neglect of welfare and political education.
The san-fan and wu-fan movements and an "anti-bureaucratism"
campaign which followed it in 1953 were the first steps in China's
transition from an initial period of economic rebuilding and po
litical consolidation to a period of rapid industrialization and
"transition to socialism."

An initial problem was to restore pro

duction, especially in private industry, since those movements
had paralyzed local initiative.

The unions were also being struc

turally reorganized in preparation for an intensified industriali
zation drive.

The unions were to concentrate all their attention

on production and political education.

They were to "avoid unim

portant duties that have little to do with production or the
masses," avoid encouraging workers into spare-time activities, and
abolish unnecessary committees and reduce administrative overhead.
According to Lai Jo-yu, at the Seventh Trade Union Congress, "the
most important task of the trade unions is to unite and lead all
workers, technical personnel and other employees so that they may
consciously and actively develop production."^
Management was not responsible for production planning and
enterprise administration.

The Party committee, assisted by the

unions and the Communist Youth League, was responsible for
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mobilizing the workers for production.^

Direct Party control of

union activities increased significantly as the Party committees
were freed from managerial responsibilities.

Union functions were

oriented away from the rather broad diversity of the previous four
years to concentrate on mobilizing workers for production.

Production, Political Education and Welfare
Emulation campaigns continued to be praised as the primary
method for increasing production.

But the new orientation brought

with it an emphasis on labor discipline and individual responsi
bility that was absent during the early years of the regime.

Not

only was the honeymoon over, but the system of one-man management
Itself was designed to function on the basis of factory discipline
rather than the production-floor spontaneity of political mobiliza
tion by union and Party cadres.
The problem of labor discipline was indeed a serious one.

By

the end of 1953 the number of Industrial workers had more than
doubled since 19^9» from 3,00^,000 to 6,188,000.

o

A major campaign

to increase labor discipline was conducted In two surges, in the
summer of 1953 and the summer of 195^, in an effort to reduce ab
senteeism among new workers still closely tied to rural families.
They also came at a time of year when heat and ventilation prob
lems exacerbated unfavorable working conditions.

The Party's an

swer to the universal problems of labor discipline in an underde
veloping country, such as the immature and rural nature of the
work force, and factory working conditions, had been political
education toward workers self-discipline.

That solution had been

inadequate, and leadership cadres charged with politically educating the workers were severely criticized. 9
In an effort to strengthen labor discipline, the Party took
the first steps.

But most of the actual work was assigned to the

unions, under Party leadership.

The suggested methods for improving

the situation were to increase and improve political education,
assist management to improve factory conditions, and increase
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management control within factories.

In fact, improvements in

factory conditions were slow to appear, and even political educa
tion was often replaced by management control and punishment.
According to early pronouncements, continued emphasis on educa
tional persuasion was not meant to rule out punitive action when
warranted.^^ Within a short time the "erroneous adoption" of "rash
methods of punishment" in place of education was being criticized,
but punitive measures "when necessary" continued to be sanctioned.

12

in the summer of 195^ new labor regulations, similar to those
in the Soviet Union, were promulgated, stipulating penalties for
13
absenteeism, tardiness and violations of factory regulations.
According to later criticism, management took advantage of the labor
discipline campaign to adopt harsh punitive methods and to shift
1A
responsibility for accidents onto the workers.
The unions them
selves had to be warned against punitivism in their own work and
to oppose punitivism by management.
To assist in the enforcement of labor discipline, workers'
courts were established In major industries.

These courts were

set up and directed by the People's Courts, guided by the unions,
and staffed by workers and employees.

Modeled on the Soviet com

radely courts, these organizations were established to settle
minor discipline cases directed to them by management.
In production work, increased sophistication and profession
alism accompanied the Soviet model.

Improvements in technique and

quality control were added to shock tactics in the emulation cam
paigns.^^ The propaganda efforts accompanying the campaigns empha
sized the need for labor discipline and personal austerity rather
than patriotism and working class superiority.

Political education

was largely replaced by labor discipline, and the hours actually
devoted to political study decreased sharply.
Workers' welfare was also neglected.

Average wages increased

much more slowly than previously and fell far behind increases in
labor productivity.^^ Labor insurance coverage was increased
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significantly by revisions in the regulations in January of 1953,'^
but even then labor insurance coverage remained relatively small.

18

In 195^ and 1955 increases in labor insurance coverage barely kept
pace with increases in the number of workers and employees even
though universal coverage had not been approximated.
It is almost impossible to draw precise conclusions from the
incomplete and confusing data available on communal labor insur
ance facilities, except to say that they have consistently been
inadequate to serve China's work force and have been limited al19
most entirely to large factories engaged in heavy industry.
Little was also done to protect the workers' safety or to enforce
good working conditions, and union responsibility was secondary to
that of the Ministry of Labor and its branch bureaus.

The unions

were assigned the task of assisting and supervising management and
mobilizing the workers to do likewise on a day-to-day basis.

How

ever, the ACFTU did not convene Its first national conference on
labor protection until 1955.

At that time basic-level unions were

instructed to set up labor protection working committees, indlcat20
ing that this had not been done previously.

Party-Union Relations
In the midst of these changes, the unions were once again
criticized for bureaucratism and divorce from the masses in late
195^ and 1955.

In many unions, it was charged, all decisions were

made by one person or a small group, and meetings were not held,
so there was no mass participation or collective leadership in
21
union work.
Union cadres considered themselves a "special group"
22
and did not rely on activists.
Moreover, they failed to show
interest in workers' welfare or to relate political education to
23
the workers own lives and problems.
There seem to have been good reasons why the unions continued
In their bureaucratic ways despite the Party's admonitions in 1953.
In this case, the charge of bureaucratism denoted a burgeoning pro
fessionalism within the unions, under the impetus of the strict
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division of responsibility and professionalism of the one-man man
agement system.
We may also assume that Party leadership also contributed to
this trend.

Direct Party leadership over union work led the unions

to abdicate responsibility for working with the masses.

With its

mass work largely taken over by the Party committees, the unions
would be further motivated to concentrate on their own bureaucratic
work.

This was always a temptation because the unions' paper work

was both prodigious and unavoidable.

In addition, while the call

in 1953 for Party leadership in union work had been implemented,
the verbal emphasis on political education had not been realized
in fact.

In any case. Party leadership over the unions was very

strong by the summer of 1955, but the situation was further com
plicated by the socialization of private industry.

Trade Unions and the Socialization of Industry
Between I9A9 and 1953 the number of private industrial estab
lishments in China steadily increased, as industrialization was
encouraged with no corresponding effort to socialize enterprises.
In 195^ that trend was, reversed; in 1955 the number of private en
terprises decreased sharply; and by the end of 1956 almost all
enterprises had been converted to joint state-private ownership.
While this change took place primarily in 1956, the unions
were being prepared for it during the preceding years.

The fact

that the unions had a role to play in the socialization process
was publicized periodically since late 1953.

Before socialization

the unions were to educate the capitalists to apply to the govern
ment for joint ownership of their factories and to call meetings
of workers and office employees "to dispel their fears."

After

joint management was established, the unions helped state manager
ial personnel familiarize themselves with factory conditions and
assisted in such routine tasks as stocktaking and "arranging per
sonnel."

The need to "dispel fears" referred to fears that wages
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would decrease In factories being socialized, fears that were ap25
parently well founded.
As the Party prepared to socialize industry, an attack was
initiated against the unions in private factories to correct two
different types of problems.
unions by capitalists.

The first was the corruption of the

As an indication of the seriousness of this

problem, the results of investigations in Tientsin and Canton were
publicized in February and March of 1955 indicating that most fac26
tory-level unions were being co-opted.
The second problem, re
lated to the first, was the failure of unions to supervise manage
ment to prevent shock tactics and excessive overtime in production
campaigns, leading to an excessive number of industrial accidents,
27
and punitivism in the enforcement of labor discipline.
A third criticism of union work lay in the opposite direction
and was directed at union officials in factories already converted
to joint ownership.

They were charged with opposing management,

continuing the class struggle, and failing to cooperate in produc
tion.

The change in ownership status changed the nature of labor-

management relations and demanded a greater emphasis on production.
The socialization of industry brought with it a fundamental
change in the unions' role in Chinese factories.

Before 1953 the

Party had relied oq mass organizations like the unions to check on
managers, landlords, and others, and the power of those organiza
tions had peaked during that period.
role in the socialization of industry.

They had also played a major
Once the Party had re

placed private managers, the unions were no longer expected to
play quite the same role of opposition to management.

This change

in relationships was the major reason for the debate over the
proper role of the unions from 1955 to 1957.
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Chapter IV
SOCIALIZATION OF INDUSTRY AND THE ROLE
OF UNIONS, 1955-1957

In March of 1955 Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih were expelled from
the Party In a major purge and policy reversal that marked the
semi-official demise of one-man management in Chinese factories.
At the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956 the new management
policy of collective leadership by the Party committees, already
in effect in most factories by that time, was officially adopted.
Under the new system, the function of technical or operational
management was separated from policy managenent.

The Party com

mittees were to be responsible for overall policy, formulation of
enterprise production plans, and negotiations with central minis
tries and other outside contacts.

The managers were to carry out

the plans established by the Party committees.
The years 1956 and 1957 saw the collectivization of agricul
ture, completion of the first five-year plan and the socialist
transformation of industry, a small "big leap forward" in Industry
and a major wage increase, and the Hundred Flowers campaign.

In

general, the multi-functional or balanced pattern of union per
formance was reestablished.

But it was also a period of intense

discussion over the proper role of the unions in socialized in
dustry.
Production, Political Education and Administrative Tasks
Toward the end of 1955 production-oriented union work shifted
once again away from labor discipline to emulation.

A major cam

paign was initiated late in 1955, for example, to complete the
first five-year plan ahead of schedule.^ A second emulation move
ment launched by the unions at this time was called the advanced
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workers campaign.

The major tasks of the unions in this campaign

reflected a renewed emphasis on balancing labor discipline with
political education:

to call workers' congresses to discuss ra

tionalization proposals, production targets, previous errors, etc.;
to educate the workers to the advanced experiences of both China
and the Soviet Union; to organize mutual aid and cooperation; and
to eliminate conservative thinking within their own ranks.
With the shift in emphasis back to emulation campaigns, and
especially toward the end of 1956, political education reemerged
as the prime method to bolster labor discipline.

One cause of the

recurrence of problems in labor discipline was the large influx of
new workers during 1956.

They needed political education to over-

come their materialism.

But the message of political education

was still not communistic; temporary sacrifice was necessary as an
investment in future material abundance.
A second problem demanding increased political education was
that the 1956 wage reform had encouraged an "economic point of
view" among veteran workers.

In addition, emphasis on factory

democracy and strengthening the workers' conferences had also con
tributed to a general relaxation in labor discipline and work atti
tudes.^ Finally, the unions were also expected to politically ed
ucate ex-capitalists, men who had owned enterprises that were now
joint- or state-owned.

In most cases, these men were retained in

administrative positions and, having become wage earners, were
eligible for union membership.
By early 1957 political education emphasized the major themes
of the early fifties:

current events and International affairs,

patriotism, and the Party's current line and leadership role.

It

also included emphasis on the correct worker attitude toward labor
in the new state enterprises.
Union administrative tasks, other than their own organization
work, also returned to the forefront, specifically those tasks
associated with the workers' conferences, welfare, and non-political

education programs.
Workers' conferences were revitalized in 1956.

Union commit

tees were once again charged with convening the conferences and
supervising the implementation of conference resolutions between
conference sessions as vi(el 1 as the administrative work connected
with the conferences.

The Party committees were given leadership

over the conferences themselves and over the general task of regu
lating relations between workers and management.^ Nevertheless,
efforts by union leaders to establish a prominent role for workers'
conferences were a key issue in the Party-union debate that fol
lowed and are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
Welfare work had been badly neglected during the previous
years.

0

Because the unions were preoccupied with carrying out pro

duction-oriented directives from above, they were not primarily a
workers' organization in outlook.

They were too busy to check on

workers' living conditions or to organize cultural and recreational
activities.

Moreover, the orientation and preferences of individ

ual union committees had had little relevance because the unions
had no power to oppose management decisions.
labor protection.

A prime example was

Despite criticisms in the press during late

195^ and 1955, the imposition of extra work hours, resulting in
high accident rates, continued to be common practice in 1956.^
When union committees opposed this practice, they were accused of
economism, and their opposition was overruled in the name of ful
filling production quotas.
In another respect, unions were also relatively helpless to
improve welfare conditions.

Many of the criticisms of workers'

living conditions during this period involved poor housing and
deficiencies in insurance and other amenities.

The unions had no

control over the total funds allocated by the central government
for workers' livelihood and welfare, except to report conditions
in the!r area.
A wage reform was carried out in early 1956 to standardize

wage policy throughout the country and to increase wages and empha
size materiai Incentives.^^ Also, iabor insurance was now caiculated on the basis of wages. '

A major effort was also initiated

during i956 to aiieviate acute shortages in urban housing.

The

construction of new housing for workers became a publicity item
almost as widely exploited as labor insurance had been during the
early fifties.

The housing problem in China was, however, severe.

From 19^9 through 1955, per capita urban living space had decreased
especially in rapidly growing industrial centers.

Major increases

in new construction in 1956 and 1957 barely arrested the decline
and were overwhelmed by large-scale migration to urban centers in
1958 and 1959.’^
Finally, the unions' administrative role in non-political ed
ucation came into prominence for the first time.

Literacy and

general education classes for industrial workers have been provided
almost exclusively in China by spare-time industrial schools.

Tech

nical education to produce skilled workers has been carried out
mainly through on-the-job apprentice training. 1 3^ Technical educa
tion to produce administrators from the ranks of the labor force
has also been through the spare-time schools to some extent, but
after the early fifties most potential administrators were sent to
full-time schools beyond union influence.

Initially, the unions

were directly responsible for organizing the spare-time schools
and for arranging apprentice-master relations in the factories.'^
Under the system of one-man management these responsibilities had
passed to management.

After the demise of that system, responsi

bility became dispersed, with emphasis once again on the unions.
In terms of emphasis and, probably, of long-term effects, the
spare-time schools have been the most important method of educating
Chinese workers.
tory.

Nevertheless, the program has had a mixed his

Students and teachers have been poorly qualified, and pro

duction demands and political meetings have left little time for
study.

During the early years of the program literacy classes pre

dominated.

Few plants conducted specialized technical courses

^5
until 1955“1956.

Education above the literacy level consisted

largely of practical demonstrations of basic skills, best handled
by experienced workers on the production floor.

While more atten

tion was paid to improving and expanding the program in the mid
fifties, new problems were created by the Great Leap Forward and
the economic crisis that followed it.

Nevertheless, substantial

success in eliminating illiteracy among workers has had a major
long term effect on the efficiency and general outlook of China's
work force.^^

Party-Union Relations
By the end of 1955 Party leadership over the unions had been
intensified by the union reorganization that accompanied the so
cialization of industry.

Party leadership had become so complete,

in fact, that the organizational integrity of the unions was
threatened.

In September of 1955 an editorial in the Jenmin Jihpao

(JMJP) initiated a discussion of union functions and union-Party
relations that continued through 1957The question was, what role do unions have in socialized in
dustry.

In response, a JMJP editorial encouraged Party committees

to "bring into full play the supervisory role of trade union or
ganizations over State organs and economic organs."

The Party

should ensure that the unions carry out Party policies, but not
usurp the unions' "concrete tasks.An article by Liu Tzu-chiu
went even further.

The major problem in union work at that time,

Liu argued, was "abject reliance" on the Party, manifested in "com
plete similarity between, and the indiscriminate mingling together
18
of, tasks of labor unions and of the Party."
Although Party
leadership over the unions was necessary, the Party and the unions
had separate functions.
This theme was continued by Lai Jo-y’u at the Eighth Party
Congress.

According to Lai, the unions spent most of their time

carrying out the policies of the Party and government, and this
led to divorce from the masses and to bureaucratism.

In fact.

46

two problems were being discussed.

On the one hand, the unions

were concentrating on carrying out the directives of Party, govern
ment and economic organs from above and were therefore neglecting
their relations with the workers.

Union cadres had begun to con

sider themselves part of the administrative establishment and
issued orders from their offices.

Since they were not communicat

ing with the workers, they could not serve as a communication link
from bottom to top or carry out genuine political education among
the workers.

The remedy for this was increased leadership over

the unions by the primary Party committees, political education,
and prodding union officials to get out of their offices to work
with the masses.
The other problem was that in some cases Party committees had
"taken everything into their own hands without making use of the
20
unions as an organization."
If the unions became organizationally
indistinguishable from the rest of the administrative establishment,
that also would preclude the unions from effectively carrying out
their work of implementing Party policies in light of the concrete
circumstances in their own factories.

Unless increased Party lead

ership over the unions was applied in the proper manner and spirit,
it could increase the problem rather than solve it.
A similar situation had developed in union relations with en
terprise directors.

In the process of changing enterprises from

private to joint state-private ownership, various forms of class
struggle had been intensified.

Once the change was made, however,

the relationship was also to change.

The new relationship was to

be one of cooperation and mutual help to accomplish common goals.
At the same time, the unions retained the function of protecting
the workers against bureaucratism by management, especially over
emphasis on production to the neglect of workers' interests.
Workers' interests were to be protected by mass supervision of
management by the workers' conferences.

In the last analysis,

workers' interests were defined as increased production.

hi
In that context, protecting workers' interests meant super
vising management to prevent the violation of Party policies and
state laws, not to maximize immediate worker remuneration.

Never

theless, union leaders were arguing that the unions and the mana
gers still had different work and different approaches to problems
and that the unions ought to provide a forum for worker opinions.
In fact, Lai Jo-yu argued that the conferences should provide a
vehicle for major decentralization in factory management, that is,
direct worker participation in factory decision-making, with the
21
unions playing a major role.
The workers' conferences, Lai
22
argued, should have equal status with management.
This entire discussion on the functions of the unions reached
a new level in 1957 with the introduction of the Hundred Flowers
campaign.

By September of 1956 it was evident to Party leaders

that the first Chinese "leap forward" in agriculture was a relative
failure, due primarily to peasant resistance to collectivization
but exacerbated by bad weather during that summer.

According to

Mao, opposition to the collectivization program was still strong
in the winter of 1956-1957.^^ This failure was officially blamed
on lower-level cadres.

In the press and in many reports and

speeches to the Eighth Party Congress in September of 1956, cadres
were criticized for commandism, dogmatism, and blind optimism.
A rectification campaign was launched to improve cadre work style.
In this case, however, the rectification was to include criticism
by groups outside the Party, distinguishing the Hundred Flowers
campaign from earlier rectifications.
Mao called for "a hundred flowers to bloom and a hundred
schools of thought to contend" as early as May of 1956, but the
2h
Hundred Flowers campaign did not actually begin until 1957.
The idea of letting all schools contend appeared in the union
press as early as May of 1956, for example, but all of the criti
cism of union work that appeared during 1956 was Issued by the
national union leadership.

In February of 1957 Mao reissued his

invitation in his famous speech on contradictions among the people,
in the factories union cadres were instructed to mobilize the workers for a major rectification campaign in five stages.

The first

stage was to be a period of contending and blooming on the mission
of the unions.

Later stages were to focus on the organizational

structure of the unions, systems and procedure work, personnel, and
the livelihood and wages of union cadres.

The first three stages

were still being “consolidated" through the end of 1957, and the
five-stage program was never completed.
The first task of the unions in the campaign was to overcome
resistance by cadres who did not want to be criticized and by
workers who feared retaliation after the campaign was over.^^

This

fact in itself was indicative of the general state of affairs.

To

encourage worker participation in the campaign, a JMJP editorial
admitted that several labor disturbances, that is, unauthorized
strikes, had occurred in the recent past.

The editorial even ar

gued that these disturbances had their “good side" because they
28
exposed cadre errors.
The most dramatic response to the call for blooming and con
tending in union work was a report on an 8,000

tour made by

Li Hsiu-jen, deputy director of the ACFTU General Office.Li's
report and letters of personal experience by other union cadres
written in response to the report were published in most of the
Chinese press.

The unions, these critics argued, did fail to sup

port worker demands and even defended administrators against the
workers.
But the reason for this was not only the failings of partic
ular union cadres.

The unions were caught between the workers on

one side and the administration and Party on the other side.

As

Party members, union cadres were subject to Party discipline which
often conflicted with worker desires.

In their relationship to

management they were given no support by other organs and were
helpless to oppose unreasonable regulations or demands for extra

working hours.

If they did resist such demands, they were accused

of economism and their opposition was overruled.

The lack of mass

participation in union work and the failure of workers to attend
meetings was caused not only by the bureaucratic work style of in
dividual cadres but also by the fact that the workers had lost re
spect for the unions.
These criticisms were supported by Lai Jo-y'u in an interview
with the Kungjen Jihpao (KJJP) that appeared on the same day that
Li's "8,000 n_Tour" appeared in the

These reports called

for increased union independence, albeit under Party guidance.
They also echoed the analysis made earlier by Liu Tzu-chiu, namely,
that over-reliance on the Party, as it was developing after the
state assumed control of industry, inhibited the transmission belt
function of the unions in both directions.

It would also seem that

this position had support from within the top Party leadership out
side the ACFTU.

According to Li Hsiu-jen, he had made his 8,000 li

tour accompanied by a "responsible comrade" from the central govern
ment to secure support for the unions from the central leadership.
During the Cultural Revolution Liu Shao-ch'i was accused of
being the actual instigator of the trip although he was also
accused, of course, of instigating all other erroneous or superceded union policies. 31 Liu's remarks at the Eighth Party Congress
were more guarded but in the same direction as those by Lai Jo-y'u:
"A system of leadership which combines collective leadership with
personal responsibility, with the Party as the nucleus should be
set up in all enterprises...al1 day-to-day affairs should be handled
according to the principle of division of labor and fixed responsi
bility."^^
The

openness of the call for operational independence for

the unions was no doubt encouraged by the general Hundred Flowers
policy.

Its reversal came with the reversal of that policy.

One

reason for Mao's speech had been to encourage criticism of cadre
performance.

Once the initial reluctance to "blooming and contend

ing" was overcome, the response far exceeded his intentions.
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attacking the "dictatorial" ieadership of the Party itseif.
When Mao's speech was finaiiy published in June of i957> it
signaled a reversal of the rectification campaign.

Included in

the June version were six criteria by which "blossoms" could be
distinguished from "weeds."

Cadres guilty of various errors, es

pecially criticism of the Party's leaders, remained under attack,
and future criticism was to be limited to individual cadres.

An

anti-rightist campaign was also initiated against those who had
abused the Party's invitation to criticize and had "attempted to
undermine" its leadership role.
In the unions the anti-rightist campaign began with public
refutation of some of the criticisms expressed during the Hundred
Flowers period.

Beginning in June, workers in some areas were or

ganized to "detect rightist weeds" and to refute the claims of
"rightist" intellectuals that welfare and working conditions in
Chinese factories were not improving. 3 3 In October and November
a series of articles in the KJJP indicated that the policy reversal
had been accomplished.

Many of the welfare demands previously

submitted by workers were characterized as unreasonable, and criti
cism that the unions "breathed through the same nose" with adminis
trators and did nothing to help the workers was now considered to
be incorrect or erroneously one-sided.

Suggestions that the unions

be abolished or limited to the administration of welfare programs
were also rejected.
The unions definitely had a function, these articles argued,
and should not be abolished.

They were a link between the Party

and the workers and did most of the concrete organizational work
related to welfare, education and production.

Union work could

not be limited to welfare work because welfare, political education,
and production were ail related.

Unions should be active in ail

three fields, "taking production as the center."

The earlier pol

icy of recognizing the good side of labor disturbances was also
reversed, and union leaders accused of encouraging disturbances
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were expelled from the Party and relieved of their union positions
35
during September and October.
In late November an article by Lai Jo-y"u acknowledged the new
oC

line, at least by implication.'^

This article continued to recog

nize that the administration and the unions had differences of view
and that the union position was a difficult one.

For the solution

of these problems, however, Lai merely rejected the old stand-bys
of increased discussion with the masses and increased reliance on
Party leadership.
One of the main indicators of the reversal was a subtle but
significant change in Lai's emphasis.

During 1956 and early 1957

Lai had argued that the Party must exercise political leadership
over the unions, but that the unions must retain their independent
organizational role and the Party must not usurp the unions' con
crete tasks.

In mid-1957 Lai began to argue that the unions must

not disappear and must have tasks separate from the Party's but
not ideological independence from the Party:
37
is the trade union platform."

"The Party platform

In May of 1958 Lai Jo-y"u died, and he was succeeded as Presi
dent (now Chairman) of the ACFTU by Liu Ning-yi at the second meet
ing of the Eighth ACFTU Executive Committee in August of 1958.
Proceeding that meeting, a rectification conference was held "under
the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist
38
Party."
This conference acted to purge three close associates
of Lai from the top echelons of the ACFTU:

Tung Hsin, a member of

the ACFTU Secretariat, Wang Jung of the ACFTU Presidium, and Ch'en
39
Yung-wen, editor-in-chief of the KJJP.
While Lai himself was not
posthumously attacked in public, he was attacked in an unpublished
report by Liu Ning-yi for opposing the Party and for buiiding a
rightist faction within the ACFTU.
The attack on Ch'en Yung-wen was the most detailed of those
40
published.
His major crime was writing an article called "Notes
on a Trip to the West," appearing in the KJJP over several days
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during 1957.

In that article he had advocated the organizational

independence of the unions and union opposition to Party one-sidedness.

His trip to the West was in fact to Yugoslavia, and the

views expressed in his article gave de facto support to the idea
of strong workers' conferences.

He was also accused of encouraging

a discussion in 1957 in the KJJP on the "crisis of trade unions."
In 1955 he had counteracted a JMJP editorial entitled "Any Accident
Must be Seriously Examined and Handled" with an editorial in the
KJJP titled "Oppose the Trend of Punitivism" (see Chapter IN, note
14).

As early as 1951 he had been one of those found guilty of

economism.

In addition, he had consistently refused to publish

Party propaganda and had collected stories about "cases of injury
and death [of workers]," and the "discharge of workers," that is,
careless or arbitrary acts by factory management.
This purge at the top was preceded by purges of union leaders
at the provincial level for their part in labor disruptions during
the summer of 1957.

Leading union officials in Hopei and Liaoning,

in particular, were accused of attacking Party leadership over the
unions and of demanding union independence and of stirring up worker
unrest on the basis of welfare issues.

ill

Under the "guise" of

"protecting workers' interests," they had "fooled" and "corroded"
the workers into attacking the Party and Party leadership over the
unions.
Despite a number of revelations during the Cultural Revolution,
it is exceedingly difficult to get a clear picture of exactly what
went on in China during this period.
nuance is simply not available.

ii2

Much of the detail and

The information made available

during the Cultural Revolution is systematically distorted to dis
credit the losers, and official Communist jargon further obscures
detailed understanding.

It is tempting to see the issue in terms

of a sympathetic union organization battling for the workers
against managers and Party administrators.

But that, I think,

would be a mistake and not just an oversimplification, even though
the issue of union independence did involve the issue of reliance
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on material incentives, which many workers presumably favored.
Union activity was only one area affected by broader issues.
One of those issues was the bureaucratism and command ism of
lower-level cadres.

To achieve the political goal of communiza-

tion the cadres had to orient their work with the masses toward
conversion in general and persuasion and education in particular
cases.

To achieve the economic goal of industrialization they had

to get the job done, thus the temptation to issue orders and coerce
the masses into following them, the very essence of bureaucratism
and commandism.

As early as 1956 Mao was making a major effort to

resolve this conflict by accelerating the pace.

The "leap forward"

in agriculture in 1956, including accelerated collectivization, was
intended not only to remove economic bottlenecks but also to pro
vide a practical educational experience that would overcome mass
resistance to changes in world outlook and orientation.

Success

on that front would also result in accelerated economic advance,
based on the new attitudes of the masses.

At the same time, con

stant political education of the cadres was also necessary.
It is now clear that Mao faced opposition among the top
leaders of the Party over his entire approach to industrialization
and socialization.

In this context, the discussion of the role of

the unions becomes more understandable.

Before the socialization

of industry there existed some doctrinal justification for distinc
tions among the Party view, the management view and the union/
worker view within factories.

After socialization there was a

tendency for these distinctions to disappear, replaced by a single
view embodied in the Party.

The argument for union independence

from the Party was that even in socialized industry there would be
conflicts, or what Mao was to call nonantagonistic contradictions,
and that the unions therefore had a distinct role to play.
But the question of union independence related directly to
the disagreement over the direction of major policy.

The unions

had become increasingly professionalized, increasingly a part of

I

an entrenched administrative elite.

An independent union organiza

tion would be free from the "politicizing” influence of lower-level
Party committees and would become an administrative bureaucracy.
Therefore, union independence had to be defined very carefully.
The issue was resolved for the unions by decisions at a higher
and broader level.

By the time of the union purge in 1958, the

Maoist policy of the Great Leap Forward had already been adopted
and partially implemented.

The basis of the Great Leap Forward

strategy in the factories was an emphasis on political mobilization
as against the strategy of reliance on material incentives, in
creased welfare benefits, and technical expertise.

While theoret

ically one task of the unions was political education and mobili
zation of the workers, this was an activity in which the Party
itself had always taken the lead and for which the Party genera
lists were better suited than the relatively professionalized and
specialized union cadres.

Thus, one tactical component of a Great

Leap strategy would be increased Party leadership over the unions,
not increased union independence.
Lai Jo-y‘u and some of his close associates had attempted to
maintain union independence from the Party and were caught in the
rapid policy changes in 1957 and 1958.

Lai's successor, Liu

Ning-yi, did not suffer the same fate.

The issue was further com

plicated by a long-standing competition between Lai Jo-yu and Liu
Ning-yi for leadership of the ACFTU.
ACFTU after 19^9 was Ch'en Yun.

The first president of the

But Ch'en was one of the inner

core of Party leaders with other important posts, and his leader
ship of the unions was mainly titular.

When he relinquished that

title in 1953, his logical successor was Liu Ning-yi, a veteran
union organizer who was also close to the top Party leadership.
Li Li-san had been the main spokesman on labor policy beginning
in I9A8-I9A9 but had also been the major victim of the union purge
in 1951.

In fact, Liu Ning-yi had replaced Li as major spokesman

for the unions after 1951.

However, Lai Jo-yu was elected ACFTU

president at the Seventh Congress, apparently because he had been
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a Party generalist not specifically connected with the unions.

He

was brought into the unions as a Party man to correct the trend
toward "trade unionism" both in the form of economism and in the
form of organizational professionalism.

By 1957 Lai himself was

analyzing problems from the perspective of the unions.
Another question still not entirely answered is the degree of
influence Lai was able to maintain during his illness in early

1958.

The general policy reversal came in mid-1957 and was par

tially reflected and acknowledged in Lai's later addresses.

Lai

and his supporters had clearly been caught on the wrong side in

1957.

By the time of the Trade Union Congress, policy changes

were already being implemented.

Decentralization of industry had

been discussed at the Third Plenum of the Party's Central Committee
in September and October of 1957 and began to be implemented in
November.

At the Trade Union Congress itself, the union constitu

tion was amended to change the structural principle of the unions
from strictly industrial (vertical) lines to both industrial and
local area (horizontal) lines, thus facilitating control of union
organs by corresponding Party organs.

But the purge did not come

until after Lai Jo-yli's death, at the rectification meeting prior
to Liu's election as ACFTU chairman in August of 1958.

At the

Eighth Trade Union Congress, Lai had been reelected ACFTU Chairman,
and Liu Ning-yi was not even reelected to a vice-chairmanship.
According to T'an Hsin-wen, after Lai's death in May "the internal
strife for the post [of chairman] was very keen."
One possible explanation for this sequence of events, offered
by Paul Harper, is that the purge had been postponed to allow an
amiable front at the Eighth Trade Union Congress and then further
postponed until the death of Lai who was critically ill in early

1958.

Perhaps another possibility is that as long as Lai was

alive, he was able to protect himself and his faction, especially
if he had support from within the top Party leadership.

Also, if

T'an Hsin-wen is correct, the Lai faction may still have been able
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to offer some resistance up to the time of the rectification con
ference.

Chapter V
THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD, 1958-1960

At the Eighth Party Congress in September of 1956 the Chinese
reassessed their application of the Soviet industrialization strat
egy to their own situation.
vancing well,
economy.

While industrial development was ad

the Chinese were disturbed by imbalances in their

The Soviet strategy involved the diversion of agricul

tural resources into heavy industry with little or no reinvestment
in agriculture.

The Chinese Communists had inherited no grain sur

plus, as the Bolsheviks had, but did inherit a large and rapidly
growing population.

Since there was no agricultural surplus to be

exploited, agricultural output would have to be increased if a high
level of industrial investment was to be continued.
By late 1957 the Party leaders were formulating a new economic
strategy for their second five-year plan.

The strategy adopted was

to increase output in both sectors simultaneously.

Heavy industry

was to retain priority in investment allocation, although agricul2
tural investment did increase slightly.
Output in agriculture and
light Industry was to be increased on the basis of reducing waste
and inefficiency and increasing labor productivity and labor pro
duction.

At the center of this strategy was the maximization of

human effort by ideological incentives and political mobilization.
The general change in economic strategy introduced at this
time was accompanied by administrative decentralization of light
industry to the provincial level, effectively removing control
from the central ministries and placing it in the hands of provincial Party committees. 3 At the same time, the enterprise Party
committees assumed complete control over operational as well as
policy-making management functions in the factories.
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With the assumption of complete enterprise leadership by the
Party, reference to the independent organizational role of the
unions ended.

The new relationship between the Party and the un

ions was epitomized in a KJJP editorial:
Trade unions are mass organizations of the
working class and trade union work forms a
part of the mass work of the Party. They
are assistants of the Party in carrying out
its work among the broad masses of workers.
Therefore, trade union organizations must not
only be politically and ideologically depend
ent upon the leadership of the Party, but also
in organizational and business matters" Trade
union organs at all levels must carry out
their work under the leadership of Party com
mittees of corresponding levels...^
To facilitate this change the unions underwent administrative de
centralization from the provincial level down.

Provincial unions

delegated to the next lower levels powers of financial administra
tion, organization, cultural and business administration, and
authorization of administrative expenditures.^ The effect was to
decrease vertical control within the union structure, and increase
horizontal control by corresponding Party committees.
The unions retained no organizational independence after mid-

1958 and therefore had no independent functions.

Their role was

to carry out Party tasks, under Party leadership, in cooperation
with the Communist Youth League.
routine tasks were neglected.

Until mid-1959 even the unions'

Union cadres were to assume the

routine duties of Party committees, allowing those committees to
concentrate on mobilizing the workers for production and the re
organization of labor to support agriculture.^ At the same time
the Party committees also assumed complete direction of the work
ers' conferences,

it was precisely this organizational change

that Lai and his associates had apparently tried to avoid.
Following the major rectification campaign of 1957 the ACFTU
had called on the unions to organize a production upsurge moti
vated by an "unprecedented increase in labor enthusiasm" resulting
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from the rectification campaign and a socialist education campaign
which had followed it.

This introduced the industrial production

phase of the Great Leap Forward.

Its basic strategy was the max

imization of human effort, nrativated by ideological incentive and
F>olitical mobilization, to increase output without increasing cap
ital investment.

The tactics were:

(1) to mobilize all potential

sources of labor, e.g., housewives, students and teachers, soldiers,
merchants, and underemployed peasants; (2) to raise work attendance
among regular workers; (3) to improve productivity among regular
workers through socialist emulation, improvement in the organiza
tion of labor, that is, reduction of personnel not directly par
ticipating in production, increasing workers' skills, and technical
innovation; and (A) to reorganize labor throughout the country.^
Thus, within industrial enterprises labor productivity would
be increased by technical innovations, and actual production out
put would be increased by mobilizing everyone available into laborintensive campaigns.

It would then be possible to reallocate part

of the industrial work force to participate in agricultural produc
tion and in newly formed small industries in rural and suburban
areas.

This reallocation or reorganization of labor was the first

phase in the so-called worker-peasant system which survived into
O

the sixties and will be discussed in Chapter VI I.
The key to production efforts during this period was neither
labor discipline nor emulation campaigns as such.

It was the mass

production movement, somewhat similar to organizing the entire in
dustrial work force into emulation campaigns within emulation cam
paigns and differing from earlier campaigns in three ways.
First, they were based almost entirely on political mobiliza
tion rather than material incentives.

In the second half of 1957,

with the beginning of the anti-rightist and socialist education
campaigns, political education increasingly dominated union attenQ

tion and shifted increasingly to the theme of class struggle.
During the Great Leap Forward itself, political education was taken
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over almost entirely by the Party committees, and political educa
tion gave way to fervent exhortation.

Wage levels were lowered

and piece wages were largely eliminated as obstacles to effective
political education.At the end of 1956 excesses in the wage
and bonus increases adopted earlier that year were adjusted, and
early in 1958 wages at the bottom of the industrial wage scale
were reduced to bring them into line with rural wages.

In part

this reduction in lower-level industrial wages was to discourage
migration to the cities.

But the general freeze in workers' wages

from 1958 through I960 was a reflection of the "politics in com
mand" philosophy of the Great Leap Forward.

But during the Great

Leap period, unlike the Cultural Revolution, the marathon mobili
zation of energies was still rationalized in terms of essentially
material rewards; the Great Leap was to be a leap to a strong and
prosperous new China.
Second, the mass production movement was much larger and more
inclusive than earlier campaigns.

Third, it was characterized by

frantic activity with few organizational or regulatory guidelines.
Since 1953 the trend had been toward increasing the planned organi
zation of emulation campaigns and replacing shock tactics and
quantitative output with technical innovation and quality control.
These trends were now reversed.^' Regulations concerning work pro
cedures were abandoned.

Labor protection work did not receive any

public notice until April of 1959 when prolonged overwork and fail12
ure to repair machinery began to seriously affect production.
Technical innovation was officially an important part of the pro
duction movement, but in November of 1959 the JMJP was still calling
for emulations based on innovations to supplement emulations based
13
on "hard work."
It was March of i960 before a major technical innovation cam
paign was actually launched, and the emphasis remained on political
14
education even during that campaign.
In any case, sophisticated
technical innovation was largely precluded by the fact that many
managers and engineers were sent down (hsia fang) to work in rural
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areas as part of the reorganization of labor and to allow the Party
committees and workers freedom to "assault" production problems.

Chapter VI
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND SOCIALIST EDUCATION,
1961-1965

Although most of China's heavy industry had been excluded from
the Great Leap Forward, by the end of i960 that campaign's policies
had precipitated a crisis throughout the entire economy.

The lack

of coordinated planning, characteristic of the Leap period, had
led to a chaotic situation.

Misallocations of investment resources,

including human resources, was perhaps the most damaging error.
Natural disasters and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance exacer
bated and climaxed the growing crisis.

Decreased agricultural pro

duction reduced the supply of raw materials for light industry,
and shortages in food and clothing reached major proportions in the
winter of I96O-I96I.

Malnutrition and disease significantly affect

ed attendance and productivity in all factories.

The millenial

enthusiasm which the cadres had been able to inspire in the workers
during the Great Leap Forward was followed by disillusionment and
apathy. ^
The policies of the Great Leap Forward were being reversed
during i960, and this tendency was formally endorsed at the Ninth
Plenum of the Party's Central Committee in January of I96I.

New

or restored policies were adopted at all functional levels.

In

terms of overall industrialization, strategy resources were reallocated to emphasize agriculture.

Planning was reinstituted,

and the central ministries regained some of the authority they
had lost.

Factory managers and technical experts were recalled,

and the "production units" themselves, that is, the restored factory managers, gained a degree of autonomy."^

In effect, the sys

tem of factory manager responsibility under collective Party
63
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leadership was restored, with the emphasis on the manager, "a sys
tem of unified administration over production by the factory mana
ger, so as to centralize leadership over all the production management activities of an enterprise."

4

Also during this period, the emphasis was once again on mater
ial incentives,

initially justified as a counter to absenteeism

and lack of work enthusiasm, material incentives increasingly took
the form of piece work wages and bonuses, first for work groups
and later for individuals.^ The first general wage raise since

1956 was announced in December of 1963.^
At the tenth plenum of the Party's Central Committee in Sep
tember of 1962, this general orientation was partially reversed to
emphasize class struggle, ideological indoctrination, and the po
litical campaign or mass movement.
however, remained in effect.

Most of the earlier policies,

Moreover, there was significant

opposition among upper- and middle-level Party cadres and offi
cials to a repetition of the Great Leap Forward.^

Transmission Belt
Beginning in the middle of 1959 the unions were directed to
resume their routine tasks, but the rehabilitation of the unions
was a slow process.

They had atrophied organizationally, and

through 1961 their first task remained to strengthen their own
"organizational construction."

They were also called on to devel

op initiative in carrying out their own work; union cadres were to
overcome the attitude that "there is work when there is assignment
from the Party, and there is no work when there is none."

0

This was not a return to organizational independence by any
means.

The unions were to continue to operate under Party leader

ship organizationally as well as politically.

Union cadres were

to be trained in Party work by the Party cadres so that routine
union work could be integrated with the "focal tasks" of the Party,
and the Party committees were to continue to investigate union
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work.

But total neglect of routine union tasks was now recognized

as an error,

in its usual manner of shifting the blame downward,

the Party leaders attributed this "error" to "new branch secre9
taries in the workshops."
To assure improvements in union performance, the pre-1958 sys
tem of vertical supervision by higher-level organs was reintroduced
in 1961,^^ but this applied only to internal administrative super
vision.

The dual structure that included both vertical and hori

zontal responsibility and facilitated Party leadership over local
union councils remained in effect.^' The list of functions specif
ically assigned to the unions in I96I was essentially the same re
curring list of routine tasks that had been assigned to them since
1948-19^9:

administrative work concerning the ongoing organization

of the unions themselves; workers' livelihood, particularly during
this period running the workers' mess halls and dormitories and
generally responding to workers' "small difficulties"; organizing
workers' congresses; administering cultural and educational facili
ties; and mobilizing the workers for production.

Production and Political Education
Production campaigns directly reflected the changed policies
of the early sixties.

While the press continued to refer to the

possibility of combining strict scientific management with mass
production movements, the emphasis changed to careful planning,
taking the problems of individual workers into account, and the
emulation of work techniques, as opposed to labor intensity and
quantity output.
The unions did not reenter the field of political education in
a big way until after the tenth plenum of the Party's Central Com
mittee in September of 1962 which launched a Socialist Education
Movement to intensify class struggle and anti-revisionism and to
revolutionize China's youth in preparation for the death of the old
elite.

The unions were to refocus all their work to emphasize po

litical education, utilizing their cultural and recreational
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facilities as "sharp tools" for political education.

Three major

themes emerged from the many but often vague and tangential direc
tives given to union cadres during this period:

class struggle,

self-reliance and hard struggle, and putting the collective inter12
est above personal interests.
Even after 1962, however, great
efforts were made to avoid the excesses of the Leap period in pro
duction campaigns.

In detailed discussions of how to conduct those

campaigns, the emphasis continued to be on quality, realism in set
ting targets, "down to earth" technical reforms, respect for the
opinions of technicians, and proficiency in basic work skills. 1 ^
In 1965 the Socialist Education Movement was intensified to
oppose continued passive resistance.

Union organs had still failed

to convince some of their cadres that mass political movements did
lA
not hinder production.
Similarly, many union cadres were contin
uing to argue that routine union functions left no time for politi
cal work, and that union participation in political work was unnec
essary since it was already being carried out by Party committees
and by the newiy instituted political departments.^^ The main op
position to the intensification of political work in the factories,
however, seems to have been based on a fear that the excesses of the
Great Leap Forward would be repeated.
During the production upsurge of I965 emphasis on political
education was once again intensified, and the unions were directed
to be more active in mobilizing the workers.'^ The caution of pre
vious campaigns, however, continued.

The unions were to continue

to emphasize industrial techniques, basic skills, and technical
cooperation; to establish models and pace-setters; to include con
crete summing-up work and assessments and comparisons; to base
emulations on practical, down-to-earth experiences and the assign
ment of specific tasks to individual workers; and to avoid the fab
rication of production figures to enhance the apparent performance
of their factories.All of these points referred to excesses
that contributed to the chaos of the Great Leap Forward.
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Wei fare
During 1961-1962 union work focused on assisting the workers
to alleviate the disastrous effects of the Great Leap forward on
their own lives.

Welfare expenditures were not increased, but union

cadres were to spend more time organizing the workers and workers'
18
families for self-reliance and frugality.
In 1962 welfare work
was incorporated into the Socialist Education Movement in the fac
tories.

An austerity campaign, advocating self-reliance and putting

collective interests above personal interests, was designed to con
trol spending in 1963 when the economy was beginning to recover from
the three hard years and commodities were beginning to reappear on
19
the market.
More inclusively, an effort was made to replace welfare funds
with political education of the earlier, socializing type rather
than the frantic exhortation of the Great Leap Forward.

With the

Socialist Education Movement political education work was integrated
with the general welfare function of going among the workers to un
derstand their problems and showing concern and “class affection"
for them.

20

Assisting the workers with their small problems was

increasingly emphasized as the key to effective political education.
Part of this program was the effort to get full-time union cadres
to participate in productive labor and to visit workers at home,
culminating in the movement to relocate union offices in the “red
dormitories" in which Party and union officials lived with workers.

2

In rural areas, where one focus of union work had been agriculture,
union cadres were sent to specific locations in the countryside to
live and work with the peasants and the workers in the agricultural
22
machinery sub-stations.
While these programs were not entirely
new in the sixties, it would appear that they were applied with more
23
success during this period than they had been previously.
A second part of this program was reliance on activists to
carry out union work at the basic levels.

By 1956 the Chinese un

ions had recruited over three million activists, and by 1958 the
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number was over three and one-half million.

By comparison, there

were an estimated 60,87^ full-time union cadres in primary-level
25
unions in 1957.
While the number of activists declined in I960
26
and 1961, the effort to recruit them was renewed in 1962.
This
extensive use of activists allowed the regime to greatly expand un
ion welfare services and also integrated large numbers of workers
into an official national organization for active participation
and administrative education.

Chapter VII
THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution climaxed the conflict
between the Maoist line and other policy lines in China discussed
in the introduction to this study.

It should be remembered, however,

that our knowledge of the rapid and complex changes after 1966 is
still far from complete.
During the sixties the unions had once again become increas
ingly professionalized as they had up until 1956-1957.

This devel

opment corresponded with other tendencies in Chinese society during
the early sixties.

Union structure had become dual again in 1961

with the restoration of vertical responsibility within the union
hierarchy.

More importantly, the Party had become increasingly

bureaucratized and professional, necessitating Mao's use of the
Red Guards and, finally, the army to attack the Party itself.

While

the unions at various levels remained largely under the guidance of
corresponding Party committees, changes in the Party itself allowed
union resistance to the new line.
The Maoist labor policy, in contrast, can be summarized from
his "Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company," originally
written in I960, largely ignored during the early sixties, and re
asserted beginning in 1965:

politics in command. Party leadership,

emphasis on the mass movement, interchanging of tasks among cadres
and workers, elimination of inhibiting rules and regulations, close
cooperation among workers, technicians and functionaries, and tech
nical innovation.' The similarity to the Great Leap Forward is
obvious.

Even technical innovation had been part of the formal

strategy of the Great Leap Forward, even if largely ignored in prac
tice.

The basic difference was that during the Cultural Revolution
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Mao and Mao's thought effectively replaced the Party as the basis
for leadership and the contents of poiiticai education.
The implementation of this policy began in the factories in
1965 when the unions were called on to "promote democracy in pro
duction."

As this tendency increased, worker organizations once

again came increasingly under Party control.

With the advent of

the Cultural Revolution, democratic worker organizations took their
lead from Mao himself and were divorced from both the Party commit
tees and the unions, actually replacing the unions in many factories
in the form of revolutionary rebel groups.
cesses evolved slowly.

Before I966 these pro

During 1965 Party leadership was emphasized

in oniy one official union pronouncement, a KJJP editorial commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the inauguration of the ACFTU.
Even that editorial had not returned to the language of 1958-1959.
But by 1966 public directives to union cadres hardly mentioned
Party leadership at all; they referred instead to "Mao's works" as
more important for successful union work than knowledge of union
3
work itself.
The shift from "politics in command" to "the thought of Mao
Tse-tung in command" was formalized at the sixth session of the
eighth executive committee of the ACFTU in April of I966.

Since

the beginning of the Socialist Education Movement the unions had
been referred to by Lenin's phrase, "schools of communism."

Now

they were to become "a schooi for the fiexibie study and applica
tion of the thought of Mao Tse-tung."^ In addition, this communique
introduced other aspects of the Maoist policy; union cadres were to
continue participating in productive labor, intensify mass supei—
vision of their own work by workers' conferences, and downgrade
material incentives.

They were also to build a "large industrial

army" in which distinctions between workers and peasants wouid be
eiiminated.
On June 9» 1966, the ACFTU issued a notice to union organs at
all levels to direct all their attention to the Cultural Revolution.^
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They were to organize the workers to study Mao's thought, partici
pate In criticizing anti-Maoists already under attack, and expose
anti-Maoists in union organizations.

This was the last communique

issued by the ACFTU, although articles did continue to appear over
the name of various revolutionary rebel groups within the ACFTU.
New committees were established in some factories in early 1967 to
take the place of the unions.

In the Shanghai Glass Machinery Plant,

for example, a "Revolution and Production Committee" was elected and
put in charge of "political, production and trade union work."^
The unions were eliminated partly because of their opposition
to the new line and partly because the new line called for new or
ganizational structures untainted by past policies.^ On December 26,
1966, a JMJP editorial announced the extension of the revolution to
industrial and mining enterprises as a new stage in the Cultural
Revolution.

0

In January of 1967 a group called the Shanghai Workers'

Revolutionary Rebels issued a "message to all Shanghai people"
announcing the seizure of Shanghai factories by revolutionary rebel,
9
that is pro-Mao, groups.
The Red Guards, however, met serious op
position within industrial enterprises.

The workers, unions, and

management perceived a common interest in opposing the disruption
of production and intrusion into the factories by the rebels. ^
The level of violence which resulted threatened production, and in
March of I967 army units entered many factories to restore order
and maintain production.
Initially at least, the major concerns of most workers seem to
have been potential personal loss due to disruptions in production,
acceptance of the authority of Party officials, most of whom were
hesitant to abandon their factories and their fate to the Red Guards,
and resentment against young students "barging into" the factories.'^
Workers seem almost unanimously to have opposed or avoided partici
pating in Red Guard activity until November and December of 1966
when the Cultural Revolution was officially extended to the factories.
When the workers did assume leadership of the Cultural Revolution at
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the bidding of one of Mao's "latest directives" in August of I968,
that event seems to have signaled a turning point away from student
"ultra-leftism" and the beginning of the end of the Cultural Revow
12
1ution.
According to Japanese and Czech correspondents, the ACFTU was
replaced on December 26, I966, by the All-China Rebel General Group
of Red Laborers. ^ While no organization continued to function con
sistently under that title, the date corresponds to the formal in
troduction of the Cultural Revolution into the factories.

According

to refugees from Canton and Shanghai, union dues were not collected
1A The ACFTU also abandoned its usually heavy in
after early 1967.
ternational program and was not represented at international Com
munist labor meetings after December of I966.
According to one analysis, the old organization was initially
maintained in name, and Liu Ning-yi was retained as chairman for
international purposes only.'^ However, although Liu Ning-yi was
subsequently attacked by the Red Guards he received significant pro
motions in the Party hierarchy in both 1965 snd 1966, presumably on
the basis of his loyalty to Mao on domestic issues.*^ His subse
quent disappearance from the ranks of China's elite resulted from
the position he took in I966 on China's foreign policy.^^
The ACFTU itself came under heavy attack early in 1967.

China's

previous labor policy was entirely ascribed to Liu Shao-ch'i's in
fluence, and that policy was criticized on three counts.'® The
first was that the unions had been welfare trade unions.

Routine

welfare amenities, the policy of concentrating on solicitude for
the workers, and the awarding of prizes were all condemned as "sugai—
coated arsenic."

This was an aspect of Liu's economism.

The second general criticism was an attack on the unions as
production trade unions.

They had concentrated on production, en

gaging the workers in a constant series of technical courses, les
sons in basic work skills, and other production-oriented activities
that took them away from studying Mao's works.

The third general
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criticism was directed at the concept of a trade union of the entire
people.

The unions had accepted for membership reformed ex-capital

ists, landlords and other bad elements, when in fact they should
19
have performed as tools of class struggle.
A fourth criticism was introduced in 1968, namely, that in 1958
Liu had been forced to change his line and had therefore resorted
to a new trick, advocating the role of docile tools for the unions
to facilitate his own control over them.

Essentially a description

of labor policy during the Great Leap Forward, this criticism was,
ironically, later used by rebellious workers who argued that their
own initiative in "making revolution" during working hours, helped
20
the workers' organizations from becoming docile tools.
The Cultural Revolution was an extreme attack on previous in
dustrial management systems and the Party structure itself, and in
that context the total demise of the ACFTU is not surprising.

Union

opposition to the Cultural Revolution can be taken as prima facie
evidence for the correctness of the Maoist attacks.

Also, the

theoretical principles of Mao's thought as expressed during the
Cultural Revolution are in sharp contrast to the implicit theory
on which union work in China had been conducted, whatever the pre
cise role of Liu Shao-ch'i.
The basic assumption of that theory was that industrialization
was prerequisite to political communization of the people.

It was

also assumed that attention to workers' livelihood would facilitate
successful political education.

In practice, a third assumption

was employed, namely that in the case of individual workers or work
groups, production effort was a relatively valid indicator of poHticai consciousness.

Since political education and production

were so intimately related in all union activities, and Individual
unions were evaluated on the basis of plant production records, it
would have been very difficult for the unions not to adopt this
assumption for practical purposes.

During 1965 union cadres began

to receive warnings that production achievement was not necessarily

a sign of good political thinking, and that politics should be put
21
first before production.
Despite some confusion on this point, generated by claims for
the magic of Mao's thought for increasing production, this point was
also a central theme early in the Cultural Revolution.

Union cadres

were also warned at that time not to confuse soiicitude and solving
livelihood problems with "penetrating ideological work," as they
22
"had in the past."
Ideally, both the conmunization of the people
and industrial production would occur.

"Grasping revolution" would

enhance production, but revolution came first.

"Our political work

is not simply for guaranteeing the success of production; it is first
of all for the success of the ideological revolutionization of man." ^
From the point of view of internal consistency, the logic of
the attack on the unions during the Cultural Revolution was unassail
able.

Production effort might well be a function of material reward

seeking and thus be antithetical to, rather than indicative of.
Communist political consciousness.

The disagreement, however, was

a result of policy changes in the mid-sixties, centering on the con
tent of political education.

Previously the dominant message had

been that present deprivation was necessary for the realization of
long-range material interests, and Party programs seemed to support
that message.

That type of political education could also approxi

mate the function of minimizing the alienating effects of prole
tarianization.

That is, political education had been designed pri

marily to secure worker support for the regime, and the presentation
of Party programs and goals had emphasized the material and patriotic
benefits eventually accruing to the workers from Party leadership.
In this context the working assumptions prove true.

Improve

ments in livelihood and welfare seem to support the political message
received by the workers, and acceptance of the political message in
duces the workers to work harder and accept temporary sacrifices.
Thus, whatever Liu's role in formulating union policy, that policy
was susceptible to the charges of economism and production in command.
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The unions had also always been a "trade union of the entire
people."

As early as 1953 Hsu Chlh-chen had spoken for the regime

against closed doorism in union recruitment.

With the nationaliza

tion of industry in 1955-1956, many former owners were kept on as
salaried factory managers and, having become wage earners, were
24
eligible for union membership.
The difference between earlier
periods and the Cultural Revolution was once again based on the
nature of political education.

The function of the unions had been

to socialize all employees except hard core counterrevolutionaries
to a position of general support for and cooperation with the regime,
and only on special occasions to act as tools of class struggle.

In

the early stages of the Cultural Revolution that conception of so
cialization was replaced by the attempt to both integrate and revo
lutionize China's youth and workers to Mao's vision by struggle
against specifically designated class enemies.
The new message of political education was, very roughly, that
political self-cultivation, through studying Mao's works and Mao's
thought, would create a nation of communist men, selfless and
devoted, who would work harder and desire no personal remuneration
in return.

A massive upsurge in production would result, but it

would be achieved by concentrating on Mao's thought, not by concen
trating on production skills.

Moreover, it would be achieved with

out the sugar-coated arsenic of even the relatively limited personal
amenities dispensed in the past so as to avoid contaminating the
ideological transformation of men's minds.
It is not difficult to understand why many cadres resisted
attempts to apply Mao's vision.

It fundamentally threatened Party

and other functionaries whose positions and working modes had become
25
increasingly related to technlc.3l skills.
It appeared as an ex
treme form of the Great Leap Forward which had precipitated economic
chaos and disaster.

It also posed a direct and obvious threat to

China's workers in its attack on economism.
In practice, the policy involved programs which included an
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overall reduction of workers' amenities.

The most obvious was the

substitution of material incentives with politics in command.

A

second example, more indicative of the complexities of the Cultural
Revolution and policy implementation in generai, was the peasantworker system.

In April of 1966 the KJJP reported on the decisions

of the sixth session of the eighth executive committee of the ACFTU,
instructing the unions to create a large industrial army in which
distinctions between workers and peasants would be eliminated.

The

ciosest actual policy to this instruction was the peasant-worker
system, in which peasants were contracted for temporary factory work
and permanent workers rotated places with peasants.

This system

had also been widely employed in 1958-1959 in a reorganization of
labor policy associated with the Great Leap Forward.

The system

had been in the news since 1962, and large-scale experimentation
had begun in 196^. 27 By 1966 the establishment of a permanent ro
tation system in some industries, such as mining and lumbering and
similar rural and suburban operations, was apparently under consid
eration.
A major advantage of the system was utiiization of peasants in
industrial roles during slack farming seasons and part-time use of
peasants in rural factories as it obviated permanent overstaffing
to accomodate emergencies and "heavy days," such as periodic cargo
1
28
unloading.
In addition to its advantages for allocating resources, the
system complemented Mao's plan of geographically dispersing small
industry and introducing the peasants to industrial life gradually.
It was also ideologically consistent with Mao's efforts to minimize
distinctions between workers and peasants, factories and the country
side.

However, those employees who were still concerned with in

dividual wages must have seen the system as beneficial to the govern
ment at their expense.

Temporary workers and contract workers

received lower pay and fewer fringe benefits than permanent workers.
They were not eligible for union membership or for labor insurance
benefits unless they were employed for a certain number of days
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during the year.

29

Since they were primarily day workers, they re

quired no sleeping quarters from the factories.

They did not bring

dependents with them, but they did bring food rations from their
communes, helping to alleviate the problem of urban food shortages.
Permanent workers could also be rotated out to communes to avoid
30
payment of pensions.
Moreover, by the sixties many of those
serving as temporary and contract workers were not otherwise peas
ants but were urban unemployed.
There were developmental advantages to the peasant-worker sys
tem, and many of its worst aspects were due to abuses of the system
rather than inherent flaws.

Nevertheless, both temporary and perma

nent workers had grievances against the system as well as its abuses.
As a political issue it was manipulated during the Cultural Revolu
tion by Maoists and anti-Maoists in efforts to woo first temporary
workers and then permanent workers.

It was finally abolished by

the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking and condemned as an exploitative scheme of Liu Shao-ch'i and Labor Minister Ma Wen-jui. 31

Chapter VIII
THE REAPPEARANCE OF THE TRADE UNIONS, 1973

Trade unions reappeared in Chinese factories only in 1973, well
after the Party had resumed its primary role in China and months
after the rehabilitation of the Communist Youth Leagued At the
national level, the ACFTU had survived In name but had received
virtually no mention for years; it has still not publicly reappeared,
references having been limited to factory and provincial-level un
ions.

Even the role of representing Chinese workers internationally

has been played by Chinese Workers' Delegations rather than the
2
ACFTU.
Much of this chapter is, therefore, devoted to outlining
the context of factory/labor policies in which the unions have re
appeared.
The main provisions of the Anshan Constitution were listed in
the previous chapter to indicate basic features of the Maoist line
in industry:

Party leadership, politics in command, mass movements,

elimination of rules and regulations, interchangeability of tasks,
technical innovation, and close cooperation among workers, tech
nicians and cadres.

Some of those policies could be realized only

after the Cultural Revolution ended.

Most important, of course,

was the need to rebuild the Party and then to strengthen its leader
ship role.

Others were modified or consolidated, beginning espe

cially in 1970, by restoring "good" rules and regulations and
strengthening the role of management and accounting in the factories,
emphasizing the role of veteran workers toward younger workers,
attending to product quality as well as quantity, and increasing
the role of experts in technical innovation to reach a cooperative
balance.

Nevertheless, politics remained in command.

To facilitate analysis, the various characteristics of the
79
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Anshan Constitution will, be discussed in terms of the interrelations
among political education, production, administrative education, and
transmission belt—the four activities or functions around which
earlier chapters have been organized.

Political Education and Production
in Chapter VII conflict over union policy was analyzed in terms
of alternate approaches to political education.

The policy of poli

tics in command since the Cultural Revolution has meant the primacy
of political education over production and worker amenities, with
class struggle as the focus of political education.

Production would

follow automatically but could not be pursued successfully for its
own sake:
Under socialist conditions, workers should of
course work hard because engaging in production
and developing the socialist economy with great
er, faster, better and more economical results
is very important for consolidating the dictar
torship of the proletariat, defeating capitalism
and supporting the world's people in their
revolutionary struggles. But, the struggle for
production cannot be isolated from class struggle
in class society.
If we bury ourselves in work
to the neglect of political line and class strug
gle, production can never be run well.3
One must "grasp revolution, [to] promote production."
In terms of our earlier differentiation between nationalistic
and communistic political education, however, Rensselear Lee has
observed that those two themes have been combined in Chinese dis
cussions about technology.

The Chinese bourgeois expert relies on

foreign technology and is therefore identified with foreign economic
exploitation.

4

The workers' self-reliance furthers the class strug

gle because it obviates relying on bourgeois experts, and it is
patriotic because it is perforce indigenous.
Earlier in this study, incentive policy was discussed primarily
in terms of material versus nonmaterial incentives.

Politics in

command means emphasizing political education over material
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incentives, and the Chinese press has not emphasized wages in recent
years. The exceptions have tended to stress the absence of large
wage differentials in Chinese factories.^ Additionally, the Maoist
line assumes that political education will replace external incen
tives, non-material as well as material, with internal or self-motivat ion.
The success of this effort is perhaps even more dependent on
worker perceptions of their role in society and in the factories
than the successful use of non-material external incentives, as
discussed in the introductory chapter.

In this sense, incentive

policy reflects the interrelatedness of various aspects of the
Maoist line.

One factor in worker perceptions is the privileged

position of workers in Chinese society.

Even when material incen

tives are not emphasized, improvements in general living standards
are not neglected.^ Moreover, although efforts to minimize the gap
between urban and rural income have been more successful

in China

than in other countries, Chinese workers are materially better off
than the peasants.

Perhaps more significantly, the wage differen

tial between workers and those in more lucrative vocations is far
smaller than in other countries.
Wage differentials between workers and other factory personnel
is most directly relevant to this argument.

Visiting thirty-eight

firms in 1966, Barry Richman found that "at a majority of the enter
prises surveyed, the ratio between the top pay and average enterprise
Q

pay was less than 2.5 to 1."

Riskln, after visiting some of the

same firms in 1972, suggests that this ratio has probably been reduced even further. q It is additionally significant that the aver
age wages of workers are about the same as the average wages of
technicians and cadres in the same factories.
In less material terms, the workers are also lauded as the
leading class in Chinese society, a theme reemphasized again after
a period of Red Guard and army prominence during the Cultural Revo
lution.^^ The workers' perception of their role in Chinese society
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may also be Influenced by the prominent pioneering role they have
played in developing new small industries at the hsien level, empha
sizing once again the themes of self-reliance and indigenous technology.
The workers' perceptions of their position in the factory may
be influenced by wage differentials within each factory, as noted
above, and three policies relating to participation and involvement
in factory life.

One such policy during this period has been the

effort to encourage collective cooperation in work groups rather
than individual competition among workers.
been the general

A second policy has

informality in Chinese factories, encouraging

workers to interact freely with staff, discussing production prob
lems, etc., without regard to hierarchical chains of command.
A third policy involves the issue of worker participation in
technology and in management.

Worker participation relates directly

to the interaction between political education and production inso
far as it actualizes the political ideology and creates self-moti
vation toward production.

It is a form of political education.

Worker participation, however, has two additional purposes.
One is to train successors, that is, to prepare the workers to ad
minister industry and society.

This is a traditional Communist goal

similar to what Lenin meant when he called the trade unions schools
of administration.

The other is to realize Mao's assumption that

tapping the wisdom of the people will produce better results.

Not

only will participation enhance worker consciousness and technical
ability; workers already have sufficient political insight and
practical wisdom to contribute substantially to both factory man
agement and technology.
As indicated above, perspectives on this issue have shifted
during the past four years away from the extremes of the Cultural
Revolution to the view that experts as well as workers do have a
role to play in technological innovation and that clear divisions
of responsibility have a place in factory management.

At the same
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time, efforts to strengthen Party leadership have enhanced the role
of Party committees in politically educating the workers.

These

shifts also mean more attention to formal efforts to educate workers
for the tasks ahead.

It is at this point that political education

and administrative education come together, and the topic of actual
worker participation will be deferred.

Political Education and Administrative Education
With politics in command, administrative education comes closer
to political education than in other periods, since political con
sciousness is seen as the major prerequisite for successorship.
During the past few years, great emphasis has been placed on train1^
ing successors among Chinese workers.
Technicians and veteran
workers are being encouraged to share their technical knowledge with
others. ^ The major vehicle for technical education, however, has
been the July 21 worker schools and colleges, instigated by a di
rective by Mao on July 21, 1968.

While many of these schools are

part-time, several of them offer full-time two-year programs.
The political aspects of administrative education have empha
sized class struggle and have centered around three major movements
or campaigns:

(l) to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought;

(2) to criticize revisionism and rectify work style; and (3) to
learn from the wel1-publicized model of the Tach'ing oil fields.
Various policy aspects overlap in these campaigns.

Organized as

mass campaigns by the Party committees, the first two combine to
emphasize class struggle through studying Mao and repudiating re
visionism.

The campaign to criticize revisionism and rectify work

style predominated in 1973, one factory reporting fourteen large
18
criticism meetings since 1972.
This movement also linked class
struggle and political education to production by mobilizing workers
19
to rectify their own work style.
The campaign to learn from
Tach'ing extended this linkage to both production and factory rela
tions by advocating the application of Mao's thought within an in
tegrated model for industry, a model overtly representing the Maoist
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line as opposed to the Liu Shao-ch'i line.

In this way, the three

campaigns complement one another and reflect Maoist priorities con
cerning the interrelationships among class struggle, intrafactory
relations, and production.
In another sense, however, in the seventies the emphasis on
class struggle has had unity as a major theme as well:
split."

"Unite, don't

On the one hand, some role for experts in technology and

management has been advocated.

On the other hand, presumably in

creased technical knowledge and raised political consciousness would
prepare the workers practically and psychologically to cooperate
with technical, engineering, and managerial staff on an equal rather
than subservient basis, thus facilitating cooperation.

One mani

festation of this possibility has been the so-called three-in-one
combination of workers, technicians, and cadres into functional
groups for such endeavors as technical innovation.

Worker Participation
The provisions of the Anshan Constitution assume that political
education, technical innovation, factory management, and production
should be integrated aspects of a single undertaking, with minimum
role differentiation among workers, cadres, and technicians.

In

practice, worker participation in technology and management takes
two forms:

participation by the workers as a whole, and the selec

tion and preparation of individual workers for promotion to techni
cian or cadre status.

The July 21 schools, discussed above, are

designed to train workers to be technicians, and a significant num
ber of workers have been promoted to technician status in recent
21
years.
Perhaps the major form of worker participation in tech
nology, however, has been the three-way combinations involved in
technical innovation.
First introduced in 1965, the three-in-one approach has gone
through three stages.

Initially, technicians seem to have played
22
the major if underpublicized role.
During the Cultural Revolu
tion, emphasis on worker initiative and self-reliance accompanied
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class struggle against experts and professionals.
ties the role of experts has reemerged.
ized by Hung Ch'i as follows:

During the seven

The present line is summar

Technical innovation must continue

to rely on the masses and on worker initiative through the threeway combinations to “wipe out the pernicious influence of 'operation
of factory by experts.'"

Technicians must participate, but they will

need guidance to avoid conservatism:

“Technicians must be encouraged

to engage in technical Innovation and scientific experimentation
boldly...[they must be used and] asked to transform themselves at
23
the same time."
Like many of the policies discussed in this chap
ter, the three-way combinations for technical innovation combine
the themes of class struggle and national integration, political education and intra-factory cooperation.

2k

The emphasis has been the reverse with respect to worker par
ticipation in management, with promotion of workers to cadre status
predominating over direct participation in management by the workers
as a whole.

As evinced throughout this study, no sustained efforts

have been made to institutionalize direct worker participation in
management.

As Paul Harper has also argued, breaking down the

boundaries between workers and staff has been achieved primarily by
cadres and technicians spending time in the workshops participating
25
in productive labor.
The period since the Cultural Revolution has been characterized,
however, by a major campaign to recruit workers into cadre positions,
comparable in scope perhaps to the time shortly after 19^9.

I rt

major industrial cities like Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin, twenty
to forty thousand promotions since the Cultural Revolution have been
reported, while similar figures have been reported for some pro26 These figures are not broken down and presumably include
Vinces.
promotions to technician status.

Many of them seem to be promotions

to membership on factory Revolutionary Committees and, more recently,
27
factory Party and trade union committees.
Within factories, the
theme that workers are now the masters of their own enterprises
has meant that now most officials are also production workers or
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ex-workers.
There has also been a corresponding increase in recruitment of
28
workers for Party membership.
At the highest level, the numbers
of production workers or ex-workers elected to the Party's Central
Committee seems to have increased along with the decrease in mili
tary representation from the Ninth to the Tenth Party Congresses.
Most significant, and publicized, was the appointment of Wang Hungwen as a vice-chairman of the Political Bureau and major figure
among the top leadership.

Two additional workers, Wu Kuei-hsien

and Ni Chih-fu were elected alternate Political Bureau members.
The list of new provincial trade union chairmen elected in 1973 in
cludes a very high proportion of Central Committee members, most of
29
whom seem to have emerged during the Cultural Revolution.
The
new union committees at local levels seem also largely staffed by
workers.
Party-Trade Union Relations and Trade Union Tasks
Trade unions have reemerged in a context of Party committee
leadership in Chinese factories.

The Party committees make major

decisions concerning political line, ideology, and production.
The Revolutionary Committee in each factory is responsible for dayto-day administration of policy.

In the absence of trade unions.

Workers Representative Congresses had assisted the Party committees
organize and mobilize the workers for study, discussion about pro
duction, recreation and welfare activities, and working with female
workers.

The reconstituted unions are inheriting these tasks.

Party committees organized the elections of the renewed unions
and carried out preparatory rectification and education programs.
The reports from the conferences at which various provincial union
committees were elected all stressed the need for strengthened Party
leadership over the unions and the role of unions as assistants to
the Party, providing an organizational link between Party and work31
ers.
The new unions are being admonished not to repeat past
errors such as neglecting class struggle and emphasizing livelihood
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and production over ideological work. 32

Under Party leadership they

are to organize and unite the workers to carry out class struggle.
Under this general

heading and

in this general

spirit or over

all orientation, more specific union tasks are emerging.

Political

education is the key, especially the organization of workers to
study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought and criticize revision
ism.

Still more specifically,

the unions are assuming a role in

training successors like running factory schools and participeting
in worker promotion,
mittees.

that had previously been assigned to Party com-

3A

In addition to education,

the unions are also resuming their

major role in the administration of workers' welfare,

including

decisions about welfare distribution, women's work, visiting work
ers to demonstrate their solicitude, and recreational

activities.

They are also to see that production work is done well, organizing
the workers to exercise self-reliance and hard work, and to grasp
revolution and promote production.

Finally,

they are to participate

in supervising cadres to follow the Party line and Party policies.
In summary,

the unions have reemerged to perform a relatively

balanced functional

role under close Party leadership, albeit with

ideological work rather than production or welfare still
as the key.
is

itself

publicized

Possibly the reemergence of the unions at this time

indicative of the more balanced orientation in Chinese

factories during the past few years which seems to reflect a re
consolidation of the Maoist line after the ideological
the Cultural

Revolution.

35

surge of

Chapter IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study, Chinese Communist union and labor policy has
been divided into seven periods,

it can also be anaiyzed in terms

of three models.

The First Model
During three of the six periods up through the Cultural Revolu
tion, Chinese unions have had several functions.

Although production

was at the center of their work, they were also engaged in transmis
sion belt, political education, and administrative activities.
The first application of this model came during 19^9~1952 when
the regime was consolidating its victory.

The unions were more in

dependent of direct Party control and more versatile in the range
of tasks performed than during any other period.

But they exper

ienced no early period of confusion and open debate on the relation
ship between Party and unions, as the Bolsheviks had.

The Party

came to power with an established organizational infrastructure
relatively prepared to control the entire country politically, and
with a pre-established policy of Party leadership over the unions.
Political education during this period emphasized national integra
tion, to wit, the necessity for active participation in production
to transform China into an industrialized nation, respect for the
working class as the "leading class" in society and the resulting
responsibilities of the working class, reference to specific bene
fits accruing to the workers since the Party came to power, such
as the labor insurance program, patriotism, especially in connection
with the Korean War, characterization of the Party as the only lead
ership group capable of creating a strong industrialized China,
89
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creation of a high degree of 61an, a spirit of all working together
to build the new China.
The unions were a transmission belt for Party policies and were
used by the Party for attacks on capitalists during the san-fan
wu-fan movement as well as for general overseeing of capitalist ac
tivities.

As "schools of administration," the unions administered

worker welfare programs and literacy education, organized new un
ions, and participated In the massive promotion of workers to cadre
and industrial line-staff positions.

To "defend workers' interests,

they organized active, if controlled, worker participation in con
ferences and councils and organized the workers for "mass super
vision" of management.
The second application of this model came during 1955~1957 with
the reinstitution of collective leadership in Chinese factories.
Emulation campaigns emphasizing political education returned to
prominence.

Workers' conferences were restored, and new efforts

were made to increase the number and role of worker activists.

Also

the wage reform of 1956 brought with it increased attention to wel
fare functions.

It was overtly argued that successful political

education depended on looking after the workers' welfare and 1ive1 i hood.
From 1961 to 1963, the first model reappeared in a slightly dif
ferent form.

During the Great Leap Forward, the unions had been

weakened organizationally by a reduction in union administrative
tasks and by the performance of political education and productionmobilization tasks directly by the Party.

In I96I the unions began

to rebuild, to "strengthen their organizational construction," and
to resume their routine tasks, that is, the various tasks assigned
to them during 19^9~1952 and 1955~1957.

The "three hard years" of

i960 to 1962 precluded a wage reform until finally a minor one was
instituted in 1963.

To compensate, new emphasis was placed on

assisting the workers with their personal difficulties and being
solicitous of workers' welfare.

In this same direction, union
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cadres were to work and live with the workers, creating a spirit of
common effort.

The Second Model
The second model of trade union performance appeared during
China's first five-year plan.

Chinese factories copied the Soviet

one-man management system, and union functions were curtailed as
they had been in the Soviet Union under that system.

While the

various union functions were not entirely eliminated, union activity
focused almost exclusively on production.

Workers' conferences

atrophied, and management control was strengthened for the applica
tion of strict labor discipline.

In general, this model is compar

able to the pattern of union performance in the Soviet Union under
Staiin.
The Third Model
The Great Leap Forward introduced the third model which is
characterized by extreme reliance on political education to Increase
production.

Work rules and material incentives alike were down

graded as the application of political education was transformed in
to personal exhortation and "shock" mobilization in which the unions
were largely by-passed in favor of direct Party contact with the
workers.

Both workers and cadres worked on the production floor,

and both cadres and workers "managed" from the production floor.
Political education, however, retained an "economistic" tint, by
stressing that this was to be a Great Leap Forward to material abun
dance.
This model reappeared during the Cultural Revolution.

Material

incentives were downgraded, and even production was no longer the
focus of factory and union life.

Political education, now defined

as Mao's thought, took command once again.

Concluding Evaluation
The Stalinist response to the problems of industrialization
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under the second model has seemed inappropriate to China.

It empha

sized resources that the Chinese have not had, especially technical
expertise, and negated China's major potential assets of labor
power, the creative power of ideological or political mobilization,
and the Party itself.

While the Chinese have attempted to create

a large body of technical experts, it has been a very slow process.
This model also relies heavily on control and coercion and thus pre
cludes voluntary participation and successful political education
for most workers.

Since it has been rejected by China's leaders

since the mid-fifties, it need not detain us here.
With the exception of that period, Chinese trade union policy
has alternated between the first and third models.

Those alterna

tions have mirrored broader political-economic conflicts between
Mao and other Party leaders.

It is tempting, therefore, to see one

of them as the Maoist model.

It is, however, more fruitful and, I

think, more correct to see the first and third models in a dialec
tical relationship.
In the first place, there are limits to the degree of control
a single leader or a group of leaders can exercise over an entire
policy area.

Beyond that, however, Mao has expected and attempted

a pattern of political intensification and relaxation or a "leap
forward" followed by consolidation at a higher level as changes
occur, for example, in China's technology and the political con
sciousness of her leaders and people.

It would also appear that

Mao's own views on policies for industry and labor have
changed with experience.

In this sense, the third model can be

viewed as a necessary but temporary application of extreme policies
to correct imbalances.

Moreover, some of the extremes of the Great

Leap Forward can be attributed to inexperience, not only on the
part of local cadres but also Mao himself, while some of the ex
cesses of the Cultural Revolution can be attributed to the gravity
of the overall situation as Mao perceived it.
In this perspective, the last few years can be seen as another
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period of consolidation in a continuing process or as walking on two
legs at a dialectically higher level.

Trade unions have not been

reestablished long enough to allow analytical perspective on this
period.

Looking primarily at the orientation of factory policy,

however, it appears to fit the first model, with the major exception
that to date, at least, political education continues to be emphasozed over production.
As detailed in the previous chapter, this period seems charac
terized by a multi-functional policy that focuses on a kind of po
litical education that combines ideological education with technical
innovation, class struggle with national self-reliance, and class
struggle with unity and cooperation.

In addition, the Party is once

more in command but presumably rectified by the Cultural Revolution
and mass recruitment of workers for Party membership and into lead
ing factory positions.

The following evaluations should be informed

by that perspective.
The extreme politics in command response to the problems of in
dustrialization has had major limitations.

The almost total abandon

ment of technology, regulations, and statistical control during the
Great Leap Forward resulted in economic disaster, and although a
major effort was made to avoid those errors during the Cultural
Revolution, an inherent incompatibility is evident.
In terms of labor policy, an attempt to create Communist work
ers by short-term ideological exhortation seems unrealistic.

Mobil

ization for common action is possible only when common Interests
are evident, necessitating a prolonged process of education and ex
perience.

Even over the long run, it has seemed to many observers

that the industrialization process itself depends on the efficiency
provided by a division of labor and routinization of role performance,
in addition to technology, mechanization, and rationalization.

This

view, however, is no longer universally held even in the West.
Unmodified applications of the first model have also involved
at least two problems.

One is that successful implementation has

9^

been difficult even when this model has been the official policy.
The other is Mao's critique of what this model has led to in the
past, even when it was successfully implemented.

The two are

closely related since a number of the practical difficulties seem
to be inherent in the policy itself, at least in the China of the
fifties and sixties.
In practice it involves a delicate balance of spontaneity and
control that has been difficult to maintain with an unsophisticated
work force, a very limited budget for consumption and incentive
purposes, and cadres with tendencies toward self-entrenchment and
concentration on their own prerequisites.

The major threats to that

balance have been posed by the Party's insistence on exercising
effective power in all areas of Chinese life and by the fact that
production has been at the center of union work.
The Party has consistently acted as a central elite allocating
duties but no political power to other elite groups and organiza
tions such as the unions.

The ACFTU as an organization has played

little if any role in China's central economic planning.

Any effort

by the unions towards organizational independence has met the Party's
almost pathological fear of syndicalism.
levels the pattern has been similar.

At lower decision-making

For example, during periods

like the Great Leap Forward when workers' councils have been pro
minent, it has been the Party committees and not the workers that
have actually been in control.
In performing the transmission belt function, union cadres have
consistently been caught in the middle.

Lack of union independence

or leverage has made it extremely difficult for the unions to com
municate up to the center.

Carrying out directives from above to

the neglect of representing the workers has caused union cadres to
lose the workers' respect and thus inhibited their ability to com
municate down effectively.

In avoiding economlsm and its logical

corollary, syndicalism, the unions have had a continuing problem
with bureaucratism and with abject reliance on the Party and
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general

ineffectiveness.

Given China's economic situation, it has no doubt also been un
avoidable that union performance has been evaluated primarily in
terms of production output.
developing countries.

This characteristic is shared with other

It has, nevertheless, forced the unions to

neglect other duties such as educating the workers, maintaining
safety rules, and upward communication.

It has also led to profes

sionalism at the expense of an orientation to political education.
Union cadres have, of course, been led to professionalism by their
own task orientation, but the professionalism of preferring tech
niques, skills and material incentives over political education to
achieve the production quotas demanded from above has also reflected
the practical realities of the industrializing process, reenforced
by the economic disaster resulting from the Great Leap Forward.
This tendency toward professionalism has also been encouraged
by the unions' administrative tasks.

After production, welfare and

other administrative tasks have been the most consistently observ
able activities of Chinese unions, despite limitations on the avail
ability of welfare funds and despite periodic attacks on material
incentives for ideological reasons.

Administration of workers' in

surance has always been entirely in the hands of the unions.

They

have assisted the Party in recruitment and promotion programs, es
pecially during the early years of the regime, and union activist
work has been a significant route for promotion into the Party and/
or line-staff administrative positions.

Chinese unions have also

consistently been assigned a role in the administration of spare
time education and apprenticeship programs, and the number of workers
participating in these programs has been extremely large.
For these reasons, union cadres have been ever present in the
lives of the workers and have played a major role in urbanizing and
integrating them into industrial society.

But by demanding so much

of their time, administrative tasks have also led the unions into
bureaucratism and professionalism.

This, in turn, has affected the
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kind of political education the workers have received.
We have repeatedly noted that professionalization has conflicted
with political education.

Moreover, the function of political ed

ucation has involved its own internal conflict between the two goals
of socialization and communication.

As used here and defined in

Chapter I, socialization means political education designed to so
cialize the Chinese workers to an acceptance of the Communist re
gime and its nationalistic and industrialization goals and programs.
Communization means political education designed tc educate Chinese
workers to an acceptance of the ideology or world view of MarxismLeninism as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung.

Before the Cultural Revo

lution, both socialization and communization were attempted simul
taneously, with the emphasis on socialization except during the
Great Leap Forward.
Theoretically these two goals are not inconsistent, and in prac
tice they are interrelated in many ways.
flict between them is also high.

But the potential for con

The attempt at socialization has

been closely related to the question of worker amenities.

A major

basis for integration into the society has been the ability to
demonstrate to the workers that the Communist regime and its pro
grams are advantageous to the workers in a concrete way.

Its effec

tiveness has been directly related to the professional orientation
toward technical skills and material incentives that has seemed
most successful in advancing Chinese industrialization in general
and workers' welfare in particular.

Communization, especially in

its extreme Maoist form, depends on a reorientation of men's de
sires away from material benefits and is therefore antithetical to
a system of material incentives.
The evaluation above is concerned principally with problems of
implementing the labor policy designated here as the first model.
The Maoist critique of that model has focused on its inherent limi
tations.

At the concrete level this has meant political education

rather than material incentives and concentration on production
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skills, and Maoist ideology rather than political socialization.
That topic is discussed next, followed by a brief exploration of the
broader issues involved in the Maoist alternative.
The practical argument for a professional approach to increased
productivity would seem to be that increased productivity depends on
labor discipline.
centives.

Labor discipline can be created by nonmaterial in

The effectiveness of contributive incentives, however, is

conditional and will depend in large measure on the workers' view
of their own position in society.

Wage levels, the degree of tech

nical skill and general education of the work force, and the degree
to which the workers are subjectively integrated into society will
all be relevant to that view.

Thus, the effectiveness of contribu

tive incentives will depend on effective socialization.

This is an

argument for political education as socialization.
Finally, labor productivity is a function not only of labor
discipline or intensification of labor but also and even primarily
of Industrial technology, mechanization, and rationalization.

In

sofar as this argument is correct, it also supports the professional
approach.

This approach will also be pushed, of course, by those

with an interest in the establishment of professional or performance
criteria rather than political criteria to protect their own favored
positions.
The ideological objection to the professional approach has
already been simply stated:

Communization depends on a reorienta

tion of men's desires away from material benefits and is therefore
inhibited by reliance on material

incentives and skill quotas.

is also inhibited by professionalization in a broader sense.

It
This

view assumes that the ultimate aim in China is concerned with re
lationships among people.

In order to maintain a Communist eco

nomic structure, China must industrialize.

But if the means of

achieving industrialization lead one on the revisionist path of
the Soviet Union, then achieving Communism will be precluded.

If,

on the other hand, the means to industrialization can be communistic
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then Communism can be achieved.
This objection to the professional approach has a positive side
also.

An effective policy of wage incentives depends on the avail

ability of consumer goods without which monetary wages are not mean
ingful.

At the same time, contributive incentives are most effective

as marginal additions to an effective monetary incentive policy.

The

Maoist answer to this dilemma would seem to be that contributive in
centives are indeed marginal
inadequate to the tasks of
technology and
terial

and conditional.

They are,

in fact,

industrialization without advances

in

in the ability to simultaneously provide strong ma

incentives.

Communization, on the other hand, does not depend on a concur
rent system of effective material
achieved because of successful
is

incentives.

communization, and the communist man

impervious to the absence of material

clude, for example,

Labor discipline is

incentives.

internal or self-motivation.

communizatIon in the broader sense,

in

At the same time,

represented by the attack on

the Party and the professionals during the Cultural
improve social and political

It will

Revolution, will

conditions for successful

education by sweeping away an entrenched bureaucracy.

political
This act will

itself change the workers' view of their role in the society by re
solving or at least continuing to deal

effectively with the distinc

tions between top and bottom and between bureaucrats and workers.
Thus,

in addition to its superiority in achieving the goal of a

communist society, communization may also be more effective in
achieving an

industrialized society.

At a broader level,
assumption that
labor,

this

is part of Mao's resistance to the

industrialization depends on a sharp division of

role distinctiveness, and routinization and that

ized societies must be integrated on that basis.
Maoist view,

those characteristics will

industrial

According to the

in fact lead to differen

tiation between leaders and followers and,

in the factories,

managers and workers, with major consequences for personal

between

relations
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and perceptions.

Managers and cadres, on the one hand, and workers,

on the other hand, will
ist brothers.

be unable to relate as communist or social

Contradictions between top and bottom will

and become entrenched.

Different groups will

also perceive differ

ently the stakes of what should be a common undertaking.
will

seek highest output at lowest cost,

quotas with least
personal

risk.

Intensify

Managers

filling and overfilling

Interference and least expenditure of energy and

The workers will

minimize their work effort.

attempt to maximize their pay and

Under a piece wage system, for example,

they will

sacrifice quality to quantity, and with standard wages

they will

cut corners to minimize their own work regardless of con

sequences to the products or overall
mal or

informal minimum standards.

factory but have their homologues
As an alternative, Mao has
ideological unity.

production except to meet for
These examples are from the

in the national

political

arena.

insisted on integration through

To achieve that unity he has looked to common

struggle and to interchanging role performance, both reminiscent
of the practical

necessities of the Yenan period.

The common enemy

to be struggled against has been either ideologically defined class
enemies or economic bottlenecks, and the military terminology during
production campaigns has been deliberate.

Interchanging role perfor

mance aims at common understanding and assumes that perceptions are
conditioned by role assignment.

The tasks that a person

is

respons

ible for in a society or enterprise, program, or process will
strongly condition his perceptions and orientation to that
tion or activity.

The worker-peasant system,

institu

the factory policy of

having cadres share In productive labor and workers participate in
technology, and the hsia-fang program are all attempts to eliminate
rigid role differentiation and encourage common understanding.
In a similar way, a case can be made for Mao's general
trialization strategy on both political

indus

and economic grounds.

The

major characteristic of that strategy has been geographically dis
persed enterprises under a system of bureaucratically decentralized
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economic planning and emphasizing intra-factory self-reliance. 2
Bureaucratic decentralization of planning is an approach to resolv
ing problems of information gathering and processing in a complex
economy that seems appropriate to China's priorities and present
stage of development.

Intra-factory self-reliance is not simply

a necessary concomitant to geographical dispersal.

It also facili

tates active worker participation in technical Innovation, decreases
the need for capital intensity in major portions of the industrial
sector, and potentially introduces all factory personnel to modern
technology in a more profound way than importing techniques and
equipment from abroad.
The potential advantages of geographical dispersal are also
more inclusive than the publicized military pose involved in regional
self-sufficiency.

Building industrial plants in the interior, close

to raw materials, may or may not be less economical than transporting
materials to established industrial complexes on the coast.

Many of

the small industries primarily involved in this dispersal, however,
directly serve agriculture, and there is, therefore, value in locat
ing them in rural areas.

Moreover, it serves the political goal of

breaking down the differences between urban and rural areas by in
troducing the peasnats to industrial culture as well as facilitating
part-time use of peasants in small industries during off-seasons.
Finally, this latter advantage can be realized without the debili
tating effects of an excessive rate of urbanization or population
if
migration to urban centers.
The Cultural Revolution is now over although its effects will
be felt in China for years to come.

A new effort is underway to

find a labor policy that will integrate both technology and worker
initiative, that will accelerate industrialization without the re
visionist side effects that for Mao characterize Soviet experience,
and that will integrate "the three revolutionary movements of class
struggle, production struggle, and scientific experiment."

It may

be that Mao's attempt to create and maintain ideological unity is
a populist dream, inappropriate to industrialized society, but thus

101

far he has been unwilling to give up either goal, ideological unity
or industrialization.
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APPENDIXES

A.

Union Membership

Year

Sources;

Trade Union Membership

19^9

2,373,000

1950

5,170,000

1951

7,297,000

1952

10,200,000

1953

12,229,000

1954

12,454,000

1956

13,720,000

1957

16,300,000

1958

17,400,000

1963

20,800,000

1965

20,800,000

1949- 1954:

Chinese Workers March Toward Socialism,
i4.

1956:

"China's workers and employees: Some
figures," Shihshih Shout'se, No. 8
fApril 21. 1957). in ECMM, No. 88.

1957:

Chunqkuo Kungjen, No. 4 (1958), cited by
T'an Hsin-wen, "Labor union movement," in
Communist China, 1949-1959, 60.

1958:

Liu Ting-yi, "Exert greater efforts and
win a greater victory," KJJP, May 1, 1959
in SCMP, No. 2016.

1963, 1965:

Peking Review, April 30, 1965*

1

lOA

B.

Year

Work Force and Trade Union Membership
(in Thousands)

T rade
Union
Membership (1)

1949

2,373

1950

1ndustrial
Workers (2)

Workers
and
Employees (4)

26,267

8,004

5,170

30,314

10,239

1951

7,297

34.730

12,815

1952

10,200

4,939

36,752

15,804

1953

12,229

6,188

39,116

18,256

1954

12,454

6,408

39,750

18,809

6,477

38,864

19,076

1955

3,004

NonAgricultural
Employees (3)

1956

13,720

8,626

39,366

24,230

1957

16,300

9,008

39,667

24,506

1958

17,400

25,623

56,867

45,323

1959

44,156

i960

45,960

Sources:

(1) Appendix A; (2) Ten G reat Years, 128; (3) Emerson,
"Employment in Mainland China," Table A-1; (4) 1949“
1958: Emerson, "Employment in Mainland China," Table
A-2; 1959“1960: Chen, Chinese Economic Statistics.
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C.

Year

Activists and Outstanding Workers

Emulation
Participants (1)

Outstanding
Workers (2)

Outstanding
Groups (3)

Activists (4)

1949
208,000

19,000

155,000

15,000

1954

234,000*

17,000

1955

316,000

21,000

2,730,000

1956

1,259,000

114,000

3,200,000

1957

1,078,000

106,000

3,482,000*

1958

2,441,000

199,000

3,490,000

1950

683,000

1951

2,380,000

1952

2,820,000

1953

80% of staff and
workers

Sources:

(1) "Fiqures and Facts," JMJP, May 1, 1955 , in CB, No.
T63: (2^andf3) Ten Great Years, 129; *374, 300 "model
and advanced" workers, in "China's trade union organiza
tion makes rapid expansion during the past year," NCNA
Peking, April 29, 1955, in CB, No. 363; also 153,900
"model" and 220,AOO "advanced" workers [total: 37^,300]
in Chinese Workers March Toward Socialism, 22; (4) 1955:
"ACFTU decision on strengthening activists' work," in
CB, No. 363; 1956: "Notification of ACFTU on convening
national conference of representatives of trade union
activists," KJJP, June 28, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1337; 1957:
"Trade union conference opens," NCNA Peking, August 21,
1957, in SCMP, No. 1597; *3,890,000 activists, Hsu Chihchen, "Work of Chinese trade unions during past four
years," KJJP. November 22, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1665; 1958:
"Exert greater efforts and win a greater victory," KJJP ,
May 1, 1959, in SCMP, No. 2014.
In comparison with the figures of

3,482,000 or 3,890,000

trade union activists in 1957, the number of full-time
trade union cadres that year was 60,874 in local, Indus
trial and primary Jevel unions.
"China's workers and
employees:
Some figures," Shihshih Shout'se, No. 8
(April

21, 1957), in ECMM, No. 88.
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D.

Workers Promoted

A.

Promotions to cadre status

1.

1950-1953, workers promoted to cadre positions in Party and
government organs totaled 107,000; workers promoted to trade
union organs above the basic level totaled 111,000. "Opening
address by Liu Ning-i," Seventh All-China Congress of Trade
Unions.

2.

1953, workers promoted to cadre positions in Party and govern
ment organs and trade union organs above the basic level
totaled 12,^3^. "Marked success made by Chinese workers on
production front in first year of five-year plan," NCNA Peking,
April 30, I95A, in SCMP, No. 806.

3.

195^, workers promoted to cadre positions:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

3,600
7,600
1,850
1,A00
7,080

to
to
to
to
to

Party organs
government organs
trade union organs above basic level
Youth League committees
other organizations

"China's trade union organization makes rapid expansion during
the past year," NCNA Peking, April 29, 1955; "The development
made in China's labor movement in 195^," KJJP, April 29, 1955;
both in CB, No. 363.

B.

Promotions within industrial enterprises

1.

Directors
a.
b.
c.

2.

1950-1953: 7,800. "Opening address by Liu Ning-i,"
Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions.
195^: 1,300. "Development made in China's labor movement
in 195^," op. cit.
1955: 1,100. "280,000 outstanding workers in China,"
NCNA Peking, April 28, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1280.

Industrial enterprise staff (shop managers, engineers, tech
nicians, etc.)
a.
b.
c.

1950-1953: 12^»,000. "Opening address by Liu Ning-i,"
Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions.
195^: 17,650, 7,200 of whom were shop chiefs. "Develop
ment made in China's labor movement in 195^," op. cit.
1955: A,300 shop managers. "280,000 outstanding workers
in China," op. cit.
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E.

Year

1 nsurance
Coverage

Labor Insurance Coverage
(in thousands)

Workers and
Employees

Industrial
Workers
3,004

Trade Union
Membership

I9A9

600

8,004

1950

1 ,400

10,239

5,170

1951

2,600

12,815

7,297

1952

3,300

15,804

4,939

10,200

1953

4,800

18,256

6,188

12,229

195^

5,380

18,809

6,408

12,454

1955

5,710

19,076

6,477

1956

7,417

24,230

8,626

13,720

1957

11,500

24,506

9,008

16,300

1958

13,779

45,323

25,623

17,400

Sources;

1nsurance Coverage: Ten Great Years, 149. For the
sources of the other figures, see Appendix B.

2,373
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NOTES

1.

Introduction

1.

Alexander Eckstein has estimated that Soviet national income
in 1928, on the eve of the Soviet first five-year plan, was
17^ above that of China in 1952 and that per capita income was
four times that of China. "Moscow-Peking axis: The economic
pattern," in Boorman et al., Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths
and Strains. For an even higher estimate of Soviet superior
ity, see Zauberman, "Soviet and Chinese strategy for economic
growth," International Affairs, XXXVIII (July I962), 339"352.

2.

Industry was essentially socialized by the end of 1956; by
1958 the communes and the Great Leap Forward policies had been
adopted by the Party. The period 1956-1958 is used here as a
dividing point, with the explicit caveat that all such pin
pointing is inexact and somewhat arbitrary.

3.

The literature elicited by the Cultural Revolution is volumi
nous. See, e.g., Chalmers Johnson, "The two Chinese revolu
tions," China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-September, 1969) for a
view emphasizing the Influence of Sino-Sovlet relations.

4.

Policy positions often develop slowly, and changes in emphasis
are difficult to pinpoint. They are, in addition, subject to
geographical diversity because of deliberate experimentation,
usually In Manchuria, level of Industrial development, and the
degree of central control in various regions of China.

5.

Arguments for consolidating the periodization of the Communist
regime into three periods, although along similar lines, are
presented by Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's twenty
years: A periodization," China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-September, 1969). The usefulness of the additional subdivisions for
my study is evident in the following discussion.

6.

Lenin assigned the unions four tasks also: transmission belt,
schools of communism (political education), schools of adminis
tration, and defense of workers' interests. Discussion of the
union role of defending workers' interests was soon dropped in
the Soviet Union, and promoting production has long been a
recognized task of the unions in both countries.
In China the
task of defending the workers is subsumed under the transmission
belt function.

7.

Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism, an infantile disorder," Selected

[1] no
Works, 871 (his emphasis). On the debates, see Margaret Dewar,
Labour Policy in the USSR I9i7~1928.
8.

This theme runs throughout Party writings on Party-union rela
tions. See especially Chapter IV.

9.

Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 7.

10.

Ibid., Article 9.

11.

"Constitution of the Trade Unions of the People's Republic of
China," as published in Labour Laws and Regulations of the
People's Republic of China.

12.

Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization In Communist China,
Chapter IV.

13.

"Constitution
speech by Hsu
Trade Unions.
e.g., "Speech
NCNA, January

1^.

See Hsii Chih-chen's speech on the revised constitution, in
Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions.

15.

Paul Harper, "Political roles of trade unions in Communist
China," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1969, PP* 3536.

16.

A different labor system with extreme implications in that
direction is that of Japan. See, e.g., Chie Nakane, Japanese
Society, 24-25.

17.

"Do not bend with the wind," JMJP, October 11, 1956, in SCMP,
No. 1400.

18.

For Chinese Communist discussions of the mass line, see Liu
Shao-ch'i, On the Party; Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Report on the
Rectification Campaign; Yen Ling, "What is the Party's mass
line?" Chenqchih Hsuehhsi, No. 6 (1955), in ECMM, No. 11
(October 24,1955)• For the best secondary analysis, see
James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China.

19.

Quoted by Andre Malraux, Anti-Memoirs, 379-

20.

Schurmann, "Organizational contrasts between Communist China
and the Soviet Union," in Kurt London, ed.. Unity and Contradic
tion. On the small group in Chinese politics in general, see
Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, 174-175;
and John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, 157-160. On

of the Trade Unions"; see also the explanatory
Chih-chen, in Seventh All-China Congress of
On developments between 1953 and 1956, see,
by Lai Jo-y’u to the Fourth Plenum of the ACFTU,"
13, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1212.
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the small group in union work, see Kung-hui hsiao-tsu chang
kungtso (Work of the Trade Union Sma11Group Leader); and
KJJP, August 6. 1965. in SCMP, No. 352^
21.

E.g., NCNA, April 29, 1951, in SCMP, No. 101; NCNA, January 3,
1953, in SCMP, No. ^88; Shang-hai Chieh-fang Jih-pao, April 8,
1953, in SCMP, No. 56^4.

22.

"Basic experiences of Wusan factory trade union movement,"
NCNA, January 3, 1953, in SCMP, No. 488.

23.

The major analysis of Chinese incentive policies has been done
by Charles Hoffman. See especially Work Incentive Practices
and Policies in the People's Republic of China.

24.

Dwight H. Perkins, Market Control and Planning in Communist
China, 147-148.

25.

The general distinction between model worker and worker acti
vist is that of production excellence versus political
activity. A union activist is a full-time worker who does
union work in his spare time.

26.

See, e.g., Article II8 of the Soviet Constitution.

27.

For one discussion of why "socialist competition" is a contra
diction in terms, and of Marx's opposition to piece wages, see
Isaac Deutscher, "Socialist competition," Foreign Affairs,
XXX (April 1952).

28.

Abram Bergson, Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since
1928, 252ff; Janet Chapman, Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since
T92F, 144-145, 176-177.

29.

On the allocation of labor in Communist China, see Christopher
Howe, Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China 1949-1957,
especially Part Two: "Employment Policy and Administration."

II.
1.

The Honeymoon Period, 1949-1952

The Marxist-Leninist doctrinal advantage of socialization is
that it eliminates class divisions within society and thereby
maximizes the production potential of each individual. The
realization of that potential also depends on the reflection
of that socialization in the political consciousness of all
the members of society, i.e., it depends on all members of
society becoming good socialists and ultimately good communists.
The practical value of socialization of the means of production
is that it allows centralized distribution of resources and
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production in accordance with economic planning and priorities.
2.

Industrial apparatus valued at more than two billion dollars
was taken from Manchuria by the Russians. Arthus G. Ashbrook,
"Main lines of Chinese Communist economic policy," in Economic
Profile of Mainland China, 18.

3.

"The democratic reform movement in Central South China," a
series of articles from Hankow Ch'angchiang Jihpao and Canton
Nanfang Jihpao, in CB, No. 115; Liu Tzu-chiu, "On the belated
introduction of the lessons of democratic reform in factories
and mines," KJJP, September 12, 1951, in CB, No. 123; KJJP,
September 25, 1952, in CB, No. 220; Euchlnic Huang, "Organizing
a new labor union," China Monthly Review, January 1951.

k.

Hsu Chih-chen, "Report on the amendment to the constitution of
the trade unions of the People's Republic of China," in Seventh
All-China Congress of Trade Unions.

5.

KJJP editorial, January 1, 1951, in SCMP, No. kk; NCNA, March
^TT951, in SCMP, No. 80.

6.

NCNA, February 10, 1953, in SCMP, No. 513.

7.

During the period 19^9-1952, 135,600 workers were promoted to
cadre positions in the Party, the government and other organs
and 124,500 were promoted to administrative and technical po
sitions in enterprises. NCNA, April 24, 1953, in SCMP, No.
559. In 1949 there were almost no industrial workers in the
Party; by 1956 there were over one-and-one-half million.
J.M.H. Lindbeck, "Transformation in the Chinese Communist
Party," in Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism, 89;
Lewis, Leadership in Communist China\108. By the end of 1952
a total of 450,000 union members had become Party members and
another 650,000 had joined the Communist Youth League. NCNA,
April 24, 1953, in SCMP. No. 559.

8.

Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China, Articles
5 and 6.

9.

Li Li-san, How to Manage a Factory; Chen Yung-wen, "Democratic
management in public enterprises," People's China, I, 9 (May 1,
1950). See also Schurmann, Ideology and Organization;
Schurmann, "Organizational Contrasts Between Communist China
and the Soviet Union."

10.

Chen Yung-wen, "Democratic management," 10.

11.

"Labour-Capital Consultative Councils in private enterprises,"
in Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China Together
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Prelude to the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 32
(October-December 1967), 3“36.

8.

JMJP, August 31, 1961, in SCMP, No. 2575; also, KJJP, Septem
ber 19, 1961, in SCMP, N0.IS02.

9.

KJJP, September 19, 1961, in SCMP, No. 2602.

10.

Yuan Hsueh-chih, "Give full play to the organizational role of
trade unions in socialist construction," KJJP, June 30, I96I,
in SCMP. No. 2548.

11.

"The structure and principle of organization of Chinese trade
unions," The Chinese Trade Unions, No. 10 (November I963).

12.

The closest to a summary in translation is Ku Ta-ch'un,
"Intensify socialist education for the working class," Hung
Ch'i, No. 1 (January 4, 1964), in SCMM, No. 402.

13.

KJJP,

14.

Canton Yangch'eng Wanpao. January

December 25, 1962, in SCMP, No. 2897.

KJJP, March

27, I965, in SCMP, No. 3396;
28, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3436.

15.

KJJP, March 28, I965, in SCMP, No. 3436; KJJP, September 19,
T^, in SCMP, No. 3552.

16.

KJJP,

17.

4, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3415; KJJP editorial . May 18,
1965, in SCMP, No. 3480. Yeh Chih-chun, "Handle properly
‘5~Good‘ assessment and comparison work and launch the '5-Good'
movement in a penetrating way," KJJP, June 26, 1965, in SCMP,
No. 3499; JMJP, January 9, 1965, two articles, both in SCMP,
No. 3388.

May

7, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3464.

NCNA, March
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18.

KJJP editorial, April 2, l‘j6l, in SOjP, No. 2hS0; 1^, October
^7T962, in SCMP, No. 2845-

19.

Mo Fei, "Be mindful of the practice
the spring festival," KJJP. January
KJJP, January 6, 1965, in SCMP, No.
cles from KJJP, April 5, 8, and 12,

20.

P'eng Ssu-ming, "Do well the work for men," KJJP> March 23,
1963, in SCMP, No. 2962; KJJP, January 6, 1965, in SCMP, No.
3385; KJJP editorial, November 12, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3595.

21.

KJJP editorial, August 17, 1963, in SCMP, No. 3059; KJJP editorial, September 17, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3549.

of thrift when observing
24, 1963, in SCMP, No. 2921;
3385; and a series of arti
1964, in SCMP, No. 3219-

22. - Yang Chun-t'ien, "How to arrange trade union work at the hsiang_
or Chen level, with support for agriculture as the main point,'
KJJP, November 25, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3357. The significance
oT^fixed points" was that earlier in the program cadres had
commuted between office and check points and thus did not really
get to know the workers.
23.

According to one article, "as far as our trade union cadres are
concerned, to do this involves a revolution in the ways of
thinking and work*" See Liu Fang-sheng, "A complete under
standing of man is the basis of success in doing ideological
work in work groups," KJJP, January 7, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3385.

24.

See Appendix C.

25.

"China's workers and employees: Some figures," Shihshih
Shout'se, No. 8 (April 21, 1957), in ECMM, No. 88\

26.

KJJP, February 23, 1963, in SCMP, No. 2944; KJ_JP_, June 22, 1963,
in SCMP, No. 3023; KJJP, November 8, 1963, in SCMP, No. 3113.

VII.

1.

The Great Proletarian Cultural

Revolution

"Two diametrically opposed lines in building the economy,"
JMJP, August 25, 1967, as reprinted in Peking Review, No. 37
■(^tember 8, I967K
These policies, especially emphasis on
political education and downgrading material incentives, were
publicized mainly in "learn from Tachai" (in agriculture) and
"learn from Tach'ing" (in

industry)

campaigns;

see, e.g..

Hung Ch'i, No. 13 (December 6, 1965), in SCMM, No. 505, on the
Tach'ing oil field model.
2.

KJJP editorial, April

30, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3467.
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3.

KJJP editorial and article, March 22, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3674.

A.

KJJP editorial and article, April 27, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3693.

5.

KJJP, June 10, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3734.

6.

NONA and JMJP, January 23, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3869.

7.

This was no doubt due in part to Liu Shao-ch'i's traditional
close association with the unions. However, as argued below,
the criticisms of union behavior launched by the Cultural
Revolution were accurate in fact if not always in spirit.

8.

Reprinted in China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-March 1967). 190191.

9. "Message to all Shanghai people," WHP, January 5, 1967; "Urgent
notice," WHP and Chiehfang Jihpao, January 9, 1967, and other
pronouncements in CB, No. 318.
10.

JMJP New Year's editorial, Peking Review, No. 1 (January 1,
1967). For a description of violent conflicts, with additional
citations, see "Industrial workers, vanguard of revolution" in
China News Analysis, No. 674 (August 25, 1967). On the gen
erally cooperative relation between unions and management in
1966, see Barry Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China,
269. On the worker-management coalition, see Oksenberg,
"Occupational groups in Chinese society and the Cultural Revo
lution," in The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review.

11.

For one first-hand account emphasizing particularly the con
fusion that must have dominated the earliest periods of the
Cultural Revolution, see Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal. Hunter
details, for example. Party complicity in the activities of the
Scarlet Guards, an organization of moderate workers constituting
the most important opposition group to Shanghai's Rebels (Red
Guards) (pp. I69-I70). This complicity, also involving factory
managers, led to such activities as paying bonuses to workers
and issuing them travel vouchers and funds, triggering the Cul
tural Revolution Center Group's major attack on economism. For
a similar description of initial worker hesitancy to join the
Red Guards in a Peking factory, see Joan Robinson, The Cultural
Revolution in China. 125-129.

12.

"Chairman Mao sends treasured gift to Peking's worker-peasant
Mao Tse-tung's Thought propaganda team," Peking Review, No. 32
(August 9, 1968); "Chai rman Mao Tse-tung's latest directive,"
Peking Review, No. 34 (August 23, 1968); Yao Wen-yuan, "The
working class must exercise leadership in everything," Hung Ch' i,
No. 2 (August 1968), in SCMM, No. 625. For the strongest argu
ment of this interpretation, see Klaus Mehnert, Peking and the
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New Left: At Home and Abroad; see also, e.g., Richard Baum,
"Year of the mangoes," Asian Survey, IX, I (January 1969).
13.

China News Analysis, No. 67^ (August 25, 1967), 2.

]k.

"Sources of labor discontent in China: The worker-peasant
system," Current Scene, VI, 5 (March 15, 1968).

15.

China News Analysis, No. 67^ (August 25, 1967).

16.

In 1965 Liu Ning-yi was elected a Vice-Chairman of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress and SecretaryGeneral of the National People's Congress. £B^, No. 752 (Feb
ruary 1, 1965).
In 1966 he seems to have continued to advance
in the Party hierarchy. See the post-eleventh plenum ranking
of top Party leaders in "Quarterly chronicle and documentation,"
China Quarterly, No. 28 (October-December 1966), 186.

17.

Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's foreign policy 'debate,' 1965-1966," in
Tsou, ed., China in Crisis, II. One NCNA release on the cere
monies for the eighteenth anniversary of the People's Republic
of China in 1967 listed Liu as ranking twentieth among the top
leaders, but another more comprehensive NCNA release did not
include his name. CB^, No. 838 and SCMP, No. A037. Although
he was seen at public receptions in Peking on January 1, 1969,
he has not been seen in public since, not even during May Day
activities. He was not reelected to the ninth Central Committee
of the Party in 1969.

18.

On the general attack on Liu Shao-ch'i, see Richard Baum and
Frederick C. Teiwes, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the cadre question,"
Asian Survey, VIII, 4 (April I968). For primary listings of
Liu's crimes, see especially C^, No. 836 (September 25, 1967),
and "A history of crimes of opposing the Party, Socialism, and
the Thought of Mao Tse-tung," in SCMM, Nos. 585, 587 and 588.

19.

NCNA,( December 1, 1967, two articles, in SCMP, No. 4073.

20.

JMJP, May 27, I968, in SCMP, No. 4214. On the complications
arising from the workers using this line, JMJP, October 22,
1968, summarized in NCNA, October 22, I968, in SCMP, No. 4287;
Huhehot radio, September 19, 1967.

21.

Yeh Chih-chun, "Handle properly '5-Good' assessment and com
parison work," KJJP, June 26, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3499;
editorial, September 19, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3552.

22.

Yang Chu-san, "In showing concern for livelihood we must pay
primary attention to one's thinking," KJJP, April 23, 1965, in
SCMP, No. 3462; KJJP, May B, I965, in SCMP, No. 3465.
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23.

C^, No. 905 (March 29, 1970).

Zk.

At that time the political education of ex-capitalists was
listed as a major union assignment. See, e.g., the various
speeches by Lai Jo-yu during 1956 and 1957.

25.

Ezra A. Vogel, "From revolutionary to semi-bureaucrat: The
'regularization' of cadres," China Quarterly, No. 29 (JanuaryMarch 1967).

26.

See Chapter V. The article "Sources of labor discontent in
China," erroneously states that the system appeared for the
first time in the sixties, apparently following the implica
tions to that effect in Chinese articles on the subject,
especially Peking Review, IX, 3 (January 14, I966), "Across
the Land" section.

27.

"Sources of labor discontent in China," 3.

28.

See, e.g., "Participation in both industry and farming work is
an important reform in the labor system," Chungkuo Fangchih,
No. 1 (January 10, 1965), in SCMM, No. 465; Chang Ho-wei, "The
worker-peasant labor system in finance and trade departments,"
Hsin Chienshe. Nos. 1-2 (February 20, 1966), in SCMM, No. 534.

29.

See, e.g., "Questions and answers on trade union membership,"
KJJP, November 23, 1962, in SCMP, No. 2885.

30.

It might be overly cynical to suggest this as a purpose of the
system; nevertheless, efficiency suggested rotating workers to
the countryside after a number of years in certain types of
factory work. "For example, the age bracket for spindle work
ers in the cotton textile and silk-reeling enterprises should
range from 18 to 26, and periodic rotation can be enforced
once about every eight years. This is because female workers
in this age bracket are most efficient in this type of work
and when sent back to the countryside at 26, they are still
able-bodied labor power." "Participation in both industry and
farming work is an important reform in the labor system" (cited
in note 28 above).
In addition to the question of pensions and
the generally higher standard of living enjoyed by workers than
by peasants, the threat of rotation to the countryside may it
self have biased many urban workers against the system.

31.

"Sources of labor discontent in China," 10; "Information about
Liu Shao-ch'i in the system of temporary labor and contract
system," by Red Rebel Team, Ministry of Labor, and Revolution
ary Rebel Team of Red Workers and Staff Members, Ministry of
Labor, January 1, 1967, published by the Red 'Criticizing Liu
Shao-ch'i' Combat Corps of Canton, January 1968, in SCMM,
No. 616. Ma Wen-jui was also a victim of the Cultural
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Revolution and was not reelected an alternate member of the
Central Committee in 1969.

Vi It.

The Reappearance of the
Trade Unions,

1973

1.

According to Chin Fu-yao, cultural officer of the People's
Republic of China's embassy in Australia, the unions had con
tinued to exist but had been inactive. Personal communication.

2.

E.g., "Chinese workers delegation visits Albania," Peking Review. No. 21 (May 26, 1972); and "Peking trade union congress,"
Peking Review, No. 17 (April 27, 1973), for reference to a
recent Chinese workers delegation to Japan.

3.

"Strive to fulfill the historical mission of the working class,"
Hung Ch'i, No. 9 (September 3, 1973), in SCMM, No. 760.

Ij.

Rensselaer W. Lee 111, "The politics of technology in Communist
China," in Johnson, ed.. Ideology and Politics in Contemporary
China.

5.

E.g., "Living standards in China improve," Peking Review, No.
40 (September 30, 1971). A more recent article makes the ex
plicit point that workers' output, quality and rejection rates
are publicly posted "to draw attention to outstanding work for
others to emulate, not as a 'material incentive.'" "Socialist
industry--The workers are the masters," Peking Review, No. 28
(July 13, 1973).

6.

See especially Carl Riskin, "Maoism and motivation: Work in
centives in China," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, V
(July 1973).

7.

E.g., "Living standards in China improve," (cited in note 5
above). For more detailed chronological comparison of wages
in one factory, see Mitch Meisner, "Report From China: The
Shenyang transformer factory—A profile," China Quarterly, No.
52 (October-December 1972), 731.

8.

Barry Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China, 80lt.

9.

Riskin, "Maoism and

motivation."

10. Meisner, "Report from China." According to Meisner, workers
averaged 6A yuan per month, state cadres and technicians 60
yuan per month. A number of articles in the Chinese press
emphasize that the Party chairman may or may not earn slightly
more than skilled workers and that Party committee members
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earn less than veteran skilled workers. E.g., "Socialist in
dustry—The workers are the masters" (cited in note 5 above).
11.

This reemergence is discussed in the previous chapter. For a
discussion of this change as reflected in Chinese literature,
especially the role of veteran workers, see my "Heroes and
villains in Chinese literature, 1968-1972," World Review, forthcoming.

12.

This point is suggested by Riskin, "Maoism and motivation."
See also Riskin, "Small industry and the Chinese model of de
velopment," China Quarterly, No. ^6 (April-June 1971); Jon
Sigurdson, "Rural industry—A traveler's view," China Quarterly,
No. 50 (April-June 1972). For an overview, see Wheelwright and
MacFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism. For recent ovei—
views, see, e.g., Peking Review, January 7, 1972; Audrey Donnithorne, "China's cellular economy," China Quarterly, No. 52
(October-December 1972).

13-

In an extreme form, work groups may be remunerated on the basis
of group output, with autonomy to decide each worker's share on
the basis of such, criteria as work effort, need, cooperative
ness, etc. As Riskin indicates, however, application in this
form has been limited in factories because a policy of time
wages rather than collective bonuses has been in effect. Ris
kin, "Maoism and motivation."

H.

On this general theme, see, e.g., Wang Hung-wen's remarks to
the Tenth Party Congress. On this general theme applied to
workers, see, e.g., Wu Kung-wen, "Training worker-cadres is a
task assigned us by history," JMJP, July 10, 1973, in SCMP,
No. 5^22; KMJP, May 13, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5382. See also
Take the Road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in Training
Technicians from Among the Workers.

15.

E.g., NCNA Tientsin. May 11, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5379-

16.

Jen Wen, "Road of training technicians from among the workers,"
Peking Review. No. 32 (August 6, 1971); JMJP, October 6, 1973,
in SCMP, No. 5481.

17.

In 1971 revisionism was criticized by repudiating Liu Shao-ch'i;
in 1973 revisionism was attacked in general until after the
Tenth Party Congress when Lin Piao was singled out. For 1971
see, e.g., "Motivation behind heroic deeds," Peking Review,
No. 50 (December 10, 1971); "Fourth five-year plan: First
year's success," Peking Review, No. 1 (January 7, 1972). On
the intensified campaign to study Mao and Marxism in 1973, see
Chang Fu-heng, "We workers must strive to study revolutionary
theories," Hung Ch'i, No. 5 (May 1, 1973), in SCMM, No. 753;
"Dockers in central China port study Marxism-Leninism," NCNA
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Wuhan, October 20, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5^86.
18.

JMJP, April 16, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5363KMJP, May 30, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5393

See also, e.g.,

19.

See especially JMJP, July 8, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5^19-

20.

On the 1973 upsurge in the campaign to learn from Tach'ing,
see especially the series of articles in £B, No. 979 (March 2,
1973). For an analysis of the relation between general policy
and fluctuations in the media prominence of the Tach'ing model,
see N.J. Knight, "Tachai and Tach'ing in the ideology and or
ganization of Communist China: 196^-1973," Honors Thesis,
University of Queensland, 1973.

21.

Jen Wen, "Road of training technicians from among the workers,"
(cited in note 16 above); "Socialist industry—The workers are
the masters" (cited in note 5 above).

22.

Richman, Industrial Society, writing about 1966.

23.

"Tap potential. Increase production." Hung Ch'i. No. 10
(October 1, 1972), in SCMM, No. 7^0; see also, e.g., Chi Ching,
"Practising economy: A principle of socialist economies,"
Peking Review, No. I8 (May k, 1973).

2k.

See also Lee, "The politics of technology in Communist China."
This kind of cooperation is potentially facilitated by the 01
ganization of Chinese unions as plant unions.

25.

Paul Harper, "Workers' participation."

26.

KMJP, April 20, 1973, and KMJP, April 22, 1973, both in SCMP,
No. 5366. KMJP, May 9, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5380.

27.

Meisner reports that in the Shenyang transformer factory he
visited in 1972, the Revolutionary Committee was established
in 1968 and that sixteen of twenty-eight members were "from
the masses." Meisner, "Report from China." According to a
recent Peking Review article on the Shanghai Watch Company,
the Party committee is entirely composed of workers with the
exception of the Secretary (concurrently chairman of the Revo
lutionary Committee), and the Revolutionary Committee is
entirely composed of workers except for one engineer and the
chairman. "Socialist industry-~-The workers are the masters,"
(cited in note 5 above).

28.

"Over 5,000 new party members of Anshan Iron and Steel Com
pany," [among workers, cadres and technical personnel] KMJP,
June 29, 1973; "Large number of new Party members among
Shanghai workers," [33,000 since the Ninth Congress in I969]
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NCNA Shanghai, July 1, 1973; "Vigorous new Party members in
Peking," [60,000, two-thirds of them workers and poor and
lower-middle peasants] NCNA Peking, July 1, 1973; all three
in SCMP, No. 5^13.
29.

No single list has come to my attention. See the series of
reports from the provincial trade union conferences in the
following 1973 Issues of SCMP: Nos. 5368, 539^, 5^04, 5413,
5418, 5428, 5440, 5448,
5462, 5476.

30.

Meisner, "Report from China";'*Social ist industry—The workers
are the masters" (cited in note 5 above).

31.

See the series of reports from provincial trade union confer
ences listed in note 29.

32.

"Socialist industry—The workers are the masters" (cited in
note 5 above); "Strive to fulfill the historical mission of
the working class" (cited in note 3 above).

33.

Sources for the rest of this chapter are primarily the series
of reports cited in note 29; also "Strive to fulfill the his
torical mission of the working class" (cited in note 3 above);
"How basic level Peking trade union works," NCNA, April 24,
1973, in SCMP, No. 5368.

34.

"New worker cadres," Peking Review, May 4, 1973; "Actively
train cadres from among workers," JMJP, July 23, 1973, in
SCMP, No. 5428.

35.

An alternate hypothesis is that the mass organizations are
being resurrected to support the Party against government or
gans. See, e.g., Henry S. Bradsher, "China: The radical
offensive." Asian Survey. XIII, 11 (November 1973).

IX.

Summary and Conclusions

1.

The entrenchment of higher political officials in China before
the Cultural Revolution is well documented and is explicit in
Mao's speech on contradictions among the people as well as the
Cultural Revolution itself. For an interesting view of efforts
by "the people" to maximize their individual and personal in
terests by learning to use the developing rules of the game in
Chinese society, see Michel Oksenberg, "The institutionaliza
tion of the Chinese Communist revolution," China (Quarterly,
No. 36 (October-December 1968).

2.

On the Maoist strategy, e.g., "China's road to socialist in
dustrialization," Peking Review, No. 43 (October 24, 1969);
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for perhaps the most enthusiastic Western scholarly descrip
tion, see E.L. Wheelwright and Bruce MacFarlane, The Chinese
Road to Socialism.
3.

For a discussion of bureaucratic decentralization, market de
centralization and "computopia" as alternative responses to
these problems see, e.g., Egon Neuberger, "Libermanism, com
putopia, and visible hand," American Economic Review: Papers
and Proceedings, May 1966, 131-1

h.

On over-urbanization as a general problem in developing coun
tries, see, e.g., Fred W. Riggs, "Modernization and political
problems: Some developmental prerequisites," in Willard A.
Beling and George 0. Totten, Developing Nations: Quest for a
Model.

135

,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The major source for this study has been the English translation
series released by the U.S. Consulate-General in Hong Kong; Items
from that series and articles from such Chinese publications as
Peking Review and China Reconstructs are not listed separately in
the bibliography.

Chinese Communist Publications

Chang Hsu-hseng, Approaches to Promote Labour Productivity in Our
Socialist Industry. Peking: Financial & Economic Publishing Co., 1956.
Chinese Workers March Toward Socialism.
Press [fLP], 1956.

Peking:

Foreign Languages

Compilation of Economic and Financial Policies and Regulations of
the Central Government. Peking: FLP, 1950.
Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions.

Peking:

FLP, 1958.

Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
FLP, 1956, 3 vols.
Handbook of Labour Statistical Work.
ing Company, 1958.

Peking:

Peking:

Statistical Publish-

Hsueh Ma-chiao, Su Hsing and Lin Tse-li, The Socialist Transforma
tion of the National Economy of China. Peking: FLP, 1960.
Hu Ch'iao-mu, Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China.
FLP, 1959.

Peking:

Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference" Peking: FTp,
1949.

Kuan Ta-tung, The Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry
and Commerce in China" Peking: FLP, I960.
Kung-hui hsiao-tsu chang kungtso (Work of the Trade Union Small
Group Leader). Peking: Kungjen ch'upanshe, 195^.
Labour Insurance in New China.

Peking:

FLP, 1953.

Labour Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China.
Peking: FLP, 1956.

136

Labor Protection Bureau, Ministry of Labor, ed.. Labour Protection
in New China. Peking: FLP, I960.
Lao-tzu kuanhsi yu chit*i hot'ung (Labor-Capital Relations and Collective Agreements). Shangha\: Hsin Hua ch'upanshe, 1955.
Li

Li-san, How to Manage a Factory.

Hong Kong, 19^9*

, Report on Trade Union Movement in China.
Publishing House, Ltd., 19^9.
Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party,

^th ed. Peking:

Bombay:

FLP, 1952.

Lu Ting-yi, "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools
of Thought Contend!" Peking: FLP, r957.
Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the
People. Peking: FLP, 1957, 1966.
National Conference of Outstanding Groups and Workers in Socialist
Construction. Peking: FLP, I960.
Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions.

Peking:

FLP, 1953.

State Statistical Bureau, Ten Great Years. Bellingham, Washington:
Western Washington State College, Program in East Asian
Studies, 197^. Occasional Paper No. 5. Originally pub
lished in Peking in I960.
Take the Road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in Training Tech
nicians From Among the Workers. Peking: FLP, n.d.
Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Report on the Rectification Campaign.
FLP, 1957.

Peking:

Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China Together with
Other Relevant Documents. Peking: FLP, 1950, 1952.

Western Publications
Abe, Munemitau, "Spare-time education in Communist China," China
(Quarterly, No. 8 (October-December 1961), H9“159.
Andors, Stephen, "Revolution and modernization," in Friedman and
Selden, eds., America's Asia.
"Army rule. Part IV:
In factories," China News Analysis, No. 711
(June 7, 1968).

People's

137

Ashbrook, Arthus G., Jr., "Main lines of Chinese Communist economic
policy," in Economic Profile of Mainland China.
Ayers, William, "Labor policy and factory management in Communist
China," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences, Vol . 277 (September 195l), 12A-13^.
Barnett, A. Doak, "Mass political organizations in Communist China,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Sciences, Vol. 277 (September 1951), 76-88.
, Communist China:
Praeger, I96A.

The Early Years.

New York:

Frederick A.

, "Aspects of the Chinese bureaucracy," China Quarterly,
No. 28 (October-December I986), 8-39.
, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action.
University of Washington Press, 1969.

Seattle:

Baum, Richard D., "'Red and expert': The politico-ideological
foundations of China's Leap Forward," Asian Survey, IV, 9
(September I96A).
, and Frederick C. Teiwes, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the cadre
question," Asian Survey, VIII, 4 (April 1968), 323~345.
, "Year of the mangoes," Asian Survey, IX, 1 (January I969).
Baling, Willard A., and George 0. Totten, eds.. Developing Nations:
Quest for a Model. New York: Van Nostrand, 1970.
Bergson, Abram, Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since 1928.
CambrIdgel Harvard University Press, 1961.
Boorman, Howard, et al., Moscow-Peking Axis:
New York: Harper 6 Brothers, 1957-

Strengths and Strains.

Bradsher, Henry S., "China: The radical offensive," Asian Survey,
XIII, 11 (November 1973), 989-IOO9.
Bridgham, Philip, "Mao's cultural revolution: Origin and develop
ment,'' £hJj]a_QtJart£Hj^, No. 29 (January-March 1967), 1~35.
Chang Yu-nan, "Industrial administration in Communist China,"
Western Political Quarterly, IX (December 1956), 850-872.
Chao, Kang, The Rate and Pattern of Industrial Growth in Communist
China. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1965.

138

Chao, Kang, "Industrialization and urban housing in Communist China,
Journal of Asian Studies. XXV, 3 (May 1966), 38I-386.
» The Construction Industry in Communist China.
A1dine Publishing Company, 1968.
”

Chicago:

Chao Kuo-ch’iin, The Mass Organizations in Communist China. Cambridge
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1953.
, "Labor in China today," United Asia. XII, 3 (I96O).
> Economic Planning and Organization in Mainland China:
Documentary Study (19^9~1957). 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1960.
Chapman, Janet, Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 1928.
Harvard University Press, I963.

Cambridge:

Chen, Nai-ruenn, Chinese Economic Statistics.
Publishing Company, 1967.

Aldine

Chicago:

» and Walter Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under Communism.
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969.
Chen, Theodore H.E., "New citizens for a new China," Current
History. Vol. kS (September ]SS5), 155-163.
Chen, Wen-hui C., Wartime 'Mass' Campaigns in Communist China.
Lackland AFB, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Re
search Center, 1955"China's economy in 1969," Current Scene. VIII, 11 (June 1, 1970).
"China's revolutionary committees," Current Scene, VI. 21 (December
26, 1968).
Clairemonte, F.F., "Labour mobilization in China's communes,"
United Asia. XII (I96O).
Communist China, 19^9-1959-

Hong Kong:

Union Research Institute,

iwi;
"The conflict between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i over agricul
tural mechanization in Communist China," Current Scene, VI,
17 (October 1, I968).
The Cultural Revolution: 19^7 in Review. Ann Arbor:
Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 2, I968.

Michigan

A

139

Dernberger, Robert, "Radical ideology and economic development in
China," Asian Survey, XII, 12 (December 1972), 10A8-1065Deutscher, Isaac, "Socialist competition." Foreign Affairs, XXX,
3 (April 1952).
Dewar, Margaret, Labour Policy in the USSR 1917~1928. London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956.
Directory of Chinese Communist Officials. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1963, 1966.
Donnithorne, Audrey, China's Economic System.
A Praeger, 1967.

New York:

U.S.

Frederick

, "China's cellular economy," China Quarterly, No. 52 (October-December 1972), 605-6I9.
Doughty, G.H., "Trade unions in China," United Asia, VIII, 2 (1956),
110-111.
Eckstein, Alexander, "Moscow-Peking axis: The economic pattern,"
in Boorman et al., Moscow-Peking Axis.
, The National Income of Communist China.
Free Press Inc., Tgrr

New York:

, "On the economic crisis in Communist China."
Affairs, XLII, k (July I96A), 655"668.

The

Foreign

, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade.
YorlTi McGraw-Hi 11 Book Company, 1966.

New

An Economic Profile of Mainland China. 2 vols. Compiled by U.S.
Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Washington: U.S. Gov
ernment Printing Office, 1967.
Emerson, John Philip, "Employment in Mainland China: Problems and
prospects," in Economic Profile of Mainland China.
Eskelund, Karl, The Red Mandarins:
Alvin Redman Ltd., 1959.

Travels in Red China.

London:

Feuerwerker, Albert, "Materials for the study of the economic his
tory of modern China," Journal of Economic History, XXI, 1
(March 1961), 4l-60.
Field, Robert Michael, "Chinese Communist industrial production,"
in Economic Profile of Mainland China.

140

Fletcher, Merton Don, "Trade unions in Communist China: A functional
comparison with the Soviet Union," Ph.D. dissertation. Uni
versity of California (Berkeley), 1968.
, "Trade Union policy in China:
Introduction to some AfroAsian comparisons," Australian Journal of Politics and His
tory, forthcoming.
, "Heroes and villains in Chinese literature, 1968-1972,"
World Review, forthcoming.
Friedman, Edward, and Mark Selden, eds., America's Asia.
Vintage Books, 1969.

New York:

Friedman, Julian R., "Labor in Nationalist China, 1945"1948," sup
plement to Israel Epstein, Notes on Labor Problems in
Nationalist China. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949.
Gardner, John, "The wu-fan campaign in Shanghai," in Barnett, ed.,
Chinese Communist Politics in Action.
Harper, Paul, Spare-Time Education for Workers in Communist China.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
, "The Party and the unions in Communist China," China
Quarterly. No. 37 (January-March 1969), 84-119.
, "Political roles of trade unions in Communist China,"
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1969.
, "Trade union cultivation of workers for leadership," in
Lewis, ed.. The City in Communist China.
, "Workers' participation in management in Communist China,"
Studies in Comparative Communism, IV (July/October 1971),
111-140.
Hoffman, Charles, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the
People's Republic of China. Albany: State University of
New York Press, I968.
Hollister, William W., China's Gross National Product and Social
Accounts, 1950~1957. New York: The Free Press, 1958.
, "Trends in capital formation in Communist China," in
Economic Profile of Mainland China.
Hooton, G.L.V., "The future of trade-unionism in China," Far Eastern
Economic Review. XVI II, 24 (June 16, 1955), 753-75^*^

141

Howe, Christopher, "The supply and administration of urban housing
in Mainland China; The case of Shanghai," China (Quarterly,
No. 33 (January-March 1968), 73"97.
, Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China 1949~1957.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
Huang, Euchinic, "Organizing a new labor union," China Monthly Re
view,' January 1951.
Hughes, T.J., and D.E. Luard, Economic Development of Communist
China 1949~1960. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Hunter, Neale, Shanghai Journal.
1969.
Hutheesing, Raja, The Great Peace.
1953.

New York:

New York:

Frederick A. Praeger,

Harper 6 Brothers,

"Industrial management in 1964-1967," China News Analysis, No. 694
(February 2, I968).
"Industrial labour and trade unions, 1957~1960," China News Analy
sis, No. 359 (February 10, I96I).
"Industrial workers, the vanguard of revolution," China News Analy
sis, No. 674 (August 25, 1967).
Johnson, Chalmers, "China: The cultural revolution in structural
perspective," Asian Survey, VIII, 1 (January 1968), 1-15.
, "The two Chinese revolutions," China Quarterly No. 39
TJuly-September 1969)*

Jones, Edwin, "The emerging pattern of China's economic revolution,
in Economic Profile of Mainland China.
Kallgren, Joyce, "Social welfare and China's industrial workers,"
in Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action.
King, Vincent, Propaganda Campaigns in Communist China. Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Interna
tional Studies, 1966.
Klein, Donald, "The 'next generation' of Chinese Communist leaders,
China Quarterly, No. 12 (October-December 1962), 57~74.
Koningsberger, Hans, Love and Hate in China.
Hill Book Company, 1966.

New York:

McGraw-

142

"Labor unions, 1948-1950," China News Analysis, No. 26 (March 5,
1954).
"Labor Unions, 1951"1952," China News Analysis. No. 31
1954).

(April 9,

Lee, Rensselaer W., III, "The 'hsia fang' system," China Quarterly,
No. 28 (October-December 1966), 40-62.
, "The politics of technology in Communist China," in
Chalmers Johnson, ed.. Ideology and Politics in Contemporary
China.
Lenin, V.I., "'Left-wing' communism, an infantile disorder," Se
lected Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1952.
Lewis, John Wilson, Leadership in Communist China.
University Press, 1963.
, ed.. The City in Communist China.
University Press, 1971.
Lethbridge, Henry J., China's Urban Communes.
Books, 1961.

Ithaca:

Cornell

Stanford:

Stanford

Hong Kong:

Dragonfly

Li, Choh-ming, ed.. Industrial Development in Communist China, New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.
Lindbeck, J.M.H., "Transformation in the Chinese Communist Party,"
in Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism.
Liu Ta-chung, "The tempo of economic development of the Chinese
Mainland, 1949~1965," in Economic Profile of Mainland China.
, and Yeh Kung-chia, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland:
National Income and Economic Development, 1933~1959. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1965.
London, Kurt, ed.. Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of SinoSoviet Relations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
Luard, D.E., "The urban communes," China Quarterly, No. 3 (JulySeptember I960), 74-79.
Lubman, Stanley, "Mao and mediation: Politics and dispute resolu
tion in Communist China," California Law Review, LV
(November I967), 1284-1359.
MacFarquhar, Roderick, The Hundred Flowers Campaign.
Stevens & Sons Limited, 196O.

London:

1^3
MacFarquhar, Roderick, "Communist China s twenty years: A periodi
zation," China Quarteriy, No. 39 (July-September 1969).
Mairaux, Andre, Anti-Memoirs.

New York

Bantam Books, 1967.

Mehnert, Klaus, Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad.
Berkeley: University of California, China Research Mono
graph No. 4, i969.
Meisner, Mitch, "Report from China: The Shenyang transformer fac
tory—A profiie," China Quarterly, No. 52 (October-December
1972), 717-736.
Montel1, Sherwin, "The san-fan wu-fan movement in Communist China,"
in Papers on China, Harvard University, Committee on Inter
national and Regional Studies, Regional Studies Seminars,
February 195^. Private distribution.
Munro, Donald, "Maxims and realities in China's educational policy,"
Asian Survey, VII, 4 (April 1967).
Myrdal, Jan, Chinese Journey.
Nakane, Chie, Japanese Society.
Press, 1970.

New York:
Berkeley:

Pantheon Books, 1965.
University of California

Neuberger, Egon, "Libermanism, computopia, and visible hand," American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 1966,
131-144.
Neuhauser, Charles, "The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960's,"
China Quarterly, No. 32 (October-December 1967)* 3~36.
, "The impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese
Communist Party machine," Asian Survey, VIM, 6 (June 1968),
465-488.
Nossal, Frederic, Dateline Peking.
World, Inc.^ 1962.

New York:

Harcourt Brace &

Oksenberg, Michel, "The institutionalization of the Chinese Com
munist revolution," China Quarterly, No. 36 (October-December
1968), 61-92.
, "Occupational
Revolution,"

groups

in Chinese society and the Cultural

in The Cultural

Revolution:

1967 in Review.

Ong, Shao-er, Labor Problems in Communist China (to February 1953).
Lackland AFB, Texas:
Air Force Personnel and Training Re
search Center,

1955.

144

Perkins, Dwight H., "Centralization and decentralization in Mainland
China and the Soviet Union," Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Sciences, Vol . 349 (September 196‘j).
70-80.
"Economic growth in China and the Cultural Revolution
(1960-April I967)," China Quarterly. No. 30 (Aoril-June
1967), 33-48.
» "Incentives and profits in Chinese industry," Current
Scene. IV, 10 (May 5, 1966).
------------» Market Control and Planning in Communist China.
Harvard University Press, 1966.

Cambridge

Pfeffer, Richard M., "The institution of contracts in the People's
Republic of China," China Quarterly. Nos. 14 and 15 (AprilJune and July-September 1963), 153-177 and 115-139.
Portisch, Hugo, Eyewitness In China.
1966.
-----------------------------> Red China Today.

Chicago:

London:

The Bodlev Head.

Quadrangle Books, I966.

Prybyla, Jan, The Political Economy of Communist China.
Pa.:
International Text Book Co., 1970.

Scranton,

Ra'anan, Uri, "Peking's foreign policy 'debate,' I965-I966," in
Tsou, ed., China in Crisis, II.
Richman, Barry, Industrial Society in Communist China.
Random House, I969.

New York:

Rigby, T.H., "The embourgeoisement of the Soviet Union and the
proletarianization of Communist China," in London, ed..
Unity and Contradiction.
Riggs, Fred W., "Modernization and political problems: Some de
velopmental prerequisites," in Beling and Totten, eds..
Developing Nations: Quest for a Model.
Riskin, Carl, "Maoism and motivation: Work incentives in China,"
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. V (July 1973), 10-24.
» "Small Industry and the Chinese model of development,"
China Quarterly. No. 46 (April-June 1971), 245-273.
Robinson, Joan, The Cultural Revolution in China.
Penguin Books, I969.

Baltimore:

Salaff, Janet, "The urban communes and anti-city experiment in Com
munist China," China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-March 1967),
82-110.
Schran, Peter, "Economic planning in Communist China," Asian Sur
vey, II, 12 (December 1962), 29~^2.
, "Some reflections on Chinese Communist economic policy,"
China Quarterly, No. 11 (July-September 1962), 58-77.
_, "Unity and diversity of Russian and Chinese industrial
wage policies," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, 2 (February
1964), 245-252.
Schurmann, Franz, "The dia lectics in action: Vicissitudes of i ndustrial management in China," Asian Survey, I, 5 (May 1961),
3-18.
_, "Economic policy and political power in Communist China,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. 349 (September 1963), 49-69.
, Ideology and Organization in Communist China.
University of California Press, 1SG6.

Berkeley:

, "Organizational contrasts between Communist China and the
Soviet Union," in London, ed.-^ Unity and Contradiction.
, "Politics and economics in Russia and China," in Treadgold,
ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism.
Schwartz, Benjamin, "Modernization and the Maoist vision: Some re
flections on Chinese Communist goals," China Quarterly,
No. 21 (January-March 1965), 3-19.
, "Totalitarian consolidation and the Chinese model," China
(Quarterly, No. 1 (January-March I960), 18-21.
Shurcliff, Alice W., "The control of industrial labor in Communist
China." Monthly Labor Review, No. 76 (August 1953), 821-825.
Sigurdson, Jon, "Rural industry—A traveler's view," China Quarterly,
No. 50 (April-June 1972), 315-332.
Solomon, Richard, "On activism and activists," China Quarterly, No.
39 (July-September 1969), 76-114.
"Sources of labor discontent in China: The worker-peasant system,"
Current Scene, VI, 5 (March 15, 1968).

146

Steiner, H. Arthur, "Trade unions in Mao's China," Problems of Com
munism, V, 2 (March-April 1956).
Stuck!, Lorenz, Behind the Great Wall.
Praeger, 19^5.

New York:

Frederick A.

T'an Hsin-wen, "Labor Union movement," in Communist China 1949~
1959. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 196l, III .
Taylor, Charles, Reporter in Red China.
1966.

New York:

Random House,

Teiwes, Frederick, Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China,
1956-1966. New York: The East Asian Institute, Columbia
University, 1967.
Townsend, James R., "Internal politics since 1956," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, June I966.
, Political Participation in Communist China.
University of California Press, 1967.

Berkeley:

"Trade union's new role in China," Far Eastern Economic Review,
XVllI, 26 (June 30, 1955), 814-815.
"Transport by rail," China News Analysis, No. 698 (March 1, 1968).
Treadgold, Donald W., ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similar
ities and Differences. Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1967.
"Trouble on the tracts," Current Scene, V, 8 (May 19» 1967).
Tsou, Tang, ed., China in Crisis.
Chicago Press, 1969.

2 vols.

Vogel, Ezra, Canton Under Communism.
sity Press, 1969.

Chicago:

Cambridge:

University of

Harvard Univer-

, "From revolutionary to semi-bureaucrat:
The 'regulari
zation' of cadres," China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-March
1967), 36-60.
Walker, Richard, "The 'working class' in Communist China," Problems
of Communism, II, 3/4 (1953).
Wheelwright, E.L. and Bruce MacFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
Wu, Yuan-1i, An Economic Survey of Communist China.
Boo km an Associates, 1 956.

New York:

1^7
Wu, Yuan-1i, "Economics, ideology and the Cultural Revolution,"
Asian Survey, VIII, 3 (March 1968), 223-235.
, The Economy of Communist China.
Praeger, 1965.

New York:

Frederick A.

, "Planning, management and economic development in Commu
nist China," in Economic Profile of Mainland China.
Yang, Richard F.S., "Industrial workers in Chinese Communist fic
tion," in Cyril Birch, ed., Chinese Communist Literature.
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
Yeh, K.C., "Soviet and Communist Chinese industrialization strate
gies," in Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism.
Yu, Frederick T.C., Mass Persuasion in Communist China.
Frederick A. Praeger, 196^.

New York:

, "With banners and drums," Current Scene, IV, 9 (May 1,

T966).
Zauberman, Alfred, "Soviet and Chinese strategy for economic growth,"
International Affairs, XXXVIII (July 1962), 339"352.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Merton Don Fletcher was born in 1938
in Connecticut.

He received his doc

torate from the University of Cali
fornia at Berkeley in 1968.

Presently

he is a lecturer in Political Science
at the University of Queensland in
Brisbane.

He is the author of several

articles dealing with contemporary
China.

WESTERN WASHINGTON STATE COLLEGE
PROGRAM IN EAST ;^IAN STUDIES

Occasional Papers

1.

MAXIMS FOR THE WELL-GOVERNED HOUSEHOLD by Chu Yung-ch'un, translated and
with a preface by Edward H. Kaplan. 1971. 10 pp. $.25. ISBN 0-914584-01-4.

2.

CHINESE POLICIES TOWARDS MINORITIES: AN ESSAY AND DOCUMENTS by Henry G. Schwarz.
1971. 200 pp. $2.50. ISBN 0-914584-02-2.

3.

THE LOVE OF NATURE: HSU HSIA-K'O AND HIS EARLY TRAVELS by LI Chi.
$3.00. ISBN 0-914584-03-0.

4.

IKKYU SOJUN:

A ZEN MONK AND HIS POETRY by Sonja Amtzen.

1973.

1971.

134 pp.

171 pp.

$3.75.

ISBN 0-914584-04-9.
5.

TEN GREAT YEARS: STATISTICS OF THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA by the State Statistical Bureau, Peking (originally
published In 1960). Introduction by Feng-hwa Mah. 1974. 155 pp.
$3.00.
ISBN 0-914584-05-7.

6.

WORKERS AND COMMISSARS:
by Merton Don Fletcher.

TRAIffi UNION POLICY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1974. vi, 1^+8 pp.
S3.00.
ISBN 0-914584-06-5.

7.

AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF CHINA by Chou Chln-sheng, translated In precis and with
an Introduction by Edward H. Kaplan. 1974.
ix, 273 PP»
$4.30.
ISBN 0-914584-07-3.

8.

MONGOLIAN SHORT STORIES edited and with an Introductory chapter by Henry G.
Schwarz. 1974.
xxv, 179 PP*
$4.00.
ISBN 0-914584-08-1.

Prices are In U.S. currency, prepaid only, and Include surface postage to
customers within the United States. Surcharges for overseas shipments are
as follows: Canada and Mexico $.25, Asia $.50, and all other areas $1.00.
Orders not accompanied by pre-payment are assessed an additional $1.00 for
handling. For further Information, write to the editor, Henry G. Schwarz,
Program In East Aslan Studies, Western Washington State College, Bellingham,
Washington
98225, U.S.A.

